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The entire system of government and administration, together
with the necessary laws, lies ready for you .... [I]f laws are
needed, Islam has established them all. There is no needfor you,
after establishing a government, to sit down and draw up laws,
or, like rulers who worship foreigners and are infatuated with the
West, run after others to borrow their laws. Everything is ready
and waiting.
-Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini'
[F]inding out what the judges say is but the beginning of your
task. You will have to take what they say and compare it with
what they do. You will have to see whether what they say
matches with what they do. You will have to be distrustful of
whether they themselves know (any better than other men) the
ways of their own doing, and of whether they describe it
accurately, even if they know it.
-Karl Llewellyn2
I. INTRODUCTION
Of all of the myths relating to the Muslim state in our times, none is more
persistent than that its legitimacy, and the legitimacy of the law it pronounces
depends on the imprimatur of shari 'a-that vast body of Muslim norms and
rules developed from Muslim sacred text: namely, the Qur'an, the revealed
word of God, and the Sunna, the actions and utterances of the Prophet
Muhammad. While there is something romantic, and almost touching, in the
notion that the Muslim world is somehow different from the rest of the globe
in the primacy it affords to God's law in establishing the rules of the legal
order, it has no basis in fact. Rather, precisely the reverse is true-shari 'a in
the modem Muslim state is only meaningful to the extent that the state chooses
to make it so, and no reasonably developed state, no matter how Islamic it
purports to be, seeks to incorporate shari'a in any sort of comprehensive
fashion. The result is a broad phenomenon of legal selectivity that effectively
recognizes the primacy of the state to determine when God's Law shall be
used, and when it shall be cast aside for a favored alternative, more often than
not a legal transplant from Europe. Thus, while shari 'a makes an appearance
I RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI, Programfor the Establishment ofan Islamic Government, in ISLAM
AND REVOLUTION: WRITINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF IMAM KHOMEm 126, 137 (Hamid Algar
trans., 1981) [hereinafter KHOMEINI].
2 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 7 (1 lth prtg. 2008).
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in the Muslim state in our times, its status qua God's law is entitled to no
presumption of validity, and, indeed, is virtually devoid of legal significance
of any kind absent state recognition thereof. "Islamic law" is, therefore, dead,
and all that remains is whatever, necessarily limited, remnants of it the state
chooses to incorporate into the legal regime.
That lawmaking in many modem Muslim nation states appears to give
rather short shrift to shari 'a, seemingly ignoring it in all areas save the law of
the family, and replacing it elsewhere with transplanted European law, has
been discussed.3 That the Muslim world is replete with political institutions
and leaders (described herein, in their multitudinous varieties and approaches,
as "Islamist") who seek a greater role for shari 'a in the affairs of the state is
obvious to anyone even faintly familiar with the region.
However, to come to the subject of this Article, left undiscussed is the fact
that the Islamist, who derives his authority precisely on the basis of returning
sovereignty to God in all matters of state and law, is no more enthused than
anyone else4 in permitting God's law to retain any real level of supremacy over
I See, e.g., BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIc LAW 188-89 (1998) (discussing the
relationship between Islamic and secular law); Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics of(Mis)recognition:
Islamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia, 52 AM. .COMP. L. 789,791-92 (2004) (discussing
the influence of the Western transplant in Islamic countries).
4 Included within this non-Islamist category, therefore, would be anyone secular, devout
or not, who holds to the notion that law could and should be determined on bases independent
of the shari'a. It is therefore extremely important to distinguish between the Muslim, an
adherent of the religion of Islam, however devout, and the Islamist, who seeks to incorporate
more shari 'a into the state. Thus, for example, the Muslim liberal, and avowedly non-Islamist,
Ali Abd al-Raziq, in his well known work Al-Islam wa usul al-hukm, argued that Islam is a
religion and not a state, that the Prophet was never a king or a founder of a political state, and
that the message of the Qur'an was a religious call divorced from politics. See, e.g., LIBERAL
ISLAM: A SOURCE BOOK 29-36 (Charles Kurzman ed., Joseph Massad trans., 1998) (translating
portions of Abd al-Raziq's work). More recently, Abdullahi An-Na'im has produced an
admirable and bracing work endorsing the notion of secularism using Islamic arguments, among
which are that God's will is fundamentally unknowable and therefore cannot sensibly be coerced
as a matter of law given the highly political manner in which law is produced. ABDULLAHI
AHMED AN-NA'IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI'A 11
(2008). It is dangerous, and inaccurate, to dismiss such secularist ideas as being marginal among
believing Muslims. Turkey's ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), whose
leadership is composed largely of devout Muslims, has proclaimed repeatedly and
unambiguously that the shari'a has no role in the affairs of the state, using arguments not
dissimilar, if less intellectually rigorous, than those advanced by An-Na'im. See Susanna
Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modem Turkey, 105 W.
VA. L. REV. 53, 126-27 (2002) (indicating that the leader of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
has clearly stated that his party endorses secularism); Don't Call AKP Islamists, Erdogan,
HORRIYET DAILY NEWS & ECON. REV., Sept. 5, 2002, available at http://www.hurriyetdaily
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the law of the state. Yet this is amply demonstrated by the Islamist obsession
with seizing state control and enacting shari'a selectively as state law, rather
than attempting the type of complete law overhaul that would be necessary to
ensure the permanent primacy of shari'a.5 Such a comprehensive and entire
approach, pure and logical as it may be, will not do for the Islamist. Thus, at
the heart of Islamist legal thinking is a central incoherence, for this notion of
state selectivity in the application of God's law sits uncomfortably with the
Islamist notion that it is God and not humanity who is the ultimate legislator.
The selectivity, while puzzling to one in search of logic in the law,
provides, in fact, much guidance to precisely why the Islamist has chosen this
road of incoherence-demanding that the law of man lie subservient to the will
of God on the one hand, and then gleefully ignoring the necessary
consequences of taking such a notion seriously on the other. It is not enough
to note that Islamist forces are often not in a position to assume the level of
control necessary to put into practice that which they preach, because plainly
this is not always true and legal selectivity reigns supreme even when Islamists
are relatively free to enact a legislative and legal agenda of their choosing.
Iran provides the starkest example. If there was a time that an Islamist
movement was going to truly render God's law the premier law of the land,
one would assume the Iranian Revolution provided the perfect occasion, both
because of the extensive power of the Islamist forces, and because of their
identity as jurists responsible for determining God's law in the first place.6
Yet even in Iran, transplanted law is used in lieu of shari 'a in any number of
areas.7 That jurists would develop extensive sets of rules, insist those rules
were God's law, further insist that God's law must be the law of the state, and
then seize political control and ignore the very God's law they have developed
in favor of a French transplant is an oddity that requires far more attention than
it has been receiving. The only satisfactory explanation involves, necessarily,
news.com/h.php?news-dont-call-akp-islamists-erdogan-2002-09-05 (stating that AKP was
founded "to embrace all right politicians and . . . is not based on religion"); Ak Party,
Development and Democratization (Feb. 2, 2007), http://eng.akpartl.org.tr/english/partyprogra
mme.html ("Our Party refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to
use them for political purposes."). The conflation of secular, devout Muslims and Islamists
seeking to place shari'a squarely into the affairs of the state is but another manifestation of the
scholarly effort to raise the profile ofshari'a as supreme Muslim law wherever practicable. See
Haider Ala Hamoudi, Orientalism and The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, 2 MIDDLE E. L.
& GOVERNANCE: AN INTERDISC. J. 81,95-97 (2010) (reviewing NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND
RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE (2008)) (criticizing one such effort).
5 See infra Part III.B-C.
6 See infra Part 1IA (concerning role ofjurists in determining shari 'a content).
7 See infra Part III.B.
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dismissing the Islamist claim concerning the sovereignty of God's law over
man's as not a true expression of that which the Islamist truly seeks, whether
he recognizes it or not.
That is, while the Islamist may say that he wishes God's law to be supreme
over that of man, there is nothing in his actions to suggest that this rhetoric,
however sincerely held, is an accurate reflection of his actual aims. The
Islamist does not want God's law to reign supreme in areas such as corporate
law and the law of business entities, where the economic consequences might
be dire.8 He does not want God's law to obliterate a general theory of
contract.9 He does not want God's law to replace transplanted ideas of
negligence. 1" On the other end lies the law of the family, where God's law is
deemed a vital necessity, and any development, evolution, or alteration of the
rules established centuries ago when caliphs walked the earth will meet with
red-faced Islamist indignation at the suggestion of such outrageous sacrilege."
With the power of lawmaking safely in the hands of the state, the Islamist need
only bring shari 'a where he wishes it (which will necessarily depend on time
and place), and leave all other, largely transplanted law where it lies, which is
to say in as authoritative a position as any shari'a-derived enactment by the
state.
The wide-scale adoption of secular, transplanted law and secular legal
systems and their continuation in force even in the most thoroughly Islamized
societies is not a matter very thoroughly discussed by our academy, except to
the extent that it is asserted as largely unnecessary to the reestablishment of a
true "Islamic state" where some form of shari 'a does indeed reign supreme.
Thus, much scholarly attention has been focused on the "repugnancy clauses"
in various Muslim state constitutions, which prohibit the enactment of laws
that are repugnant to shari'a, or at least its "certain rulings,"' 2 its principles, 3
its "beliefs,"' 4 or something broadly equivalent. The focus on such clauses is
striking, and portentous phrases on their importance are rife in our scholarship,
8 See infra Part III.B.1.
9 See infra Part III.B.1.
10 See infra Part III.C.1.
1 See infra Part III.C.3.
12 IRAQ CONST. art. 2 (author's translation).
13 EGYPT CONST. art. 2 (amended 1980).
14 AFG. CONST. ch.1, art. 3.
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among them the "Rise of the Islamic State,' ' 5 "theocratic constitutionalism,,' ' 6
and "Islamic constitutionalism.""1
7
Under the theory of repugnancy, the task of the judicial branch, using a
form of constitutional review, is to ensure that all state law is in broad
conformity with shari 'a. God's law will thus remain generally supreme over
the state, given its recognition in constitutional text. I leave to others any
evaluation of the historicity of such an approach, or its Islamic legitimacy
under whatever standard, i" and offer only two points. First, to the extent that
an "Islamic state" can be formed under such a conception, it only seems to
confirm how fundamentally limited the role of shari'a has become in the
"Islamic state." This is because shari 'a, as it has been developed, is not the
expression of broad constitutional norms, but a vast body of extensive and
detailed substantive legal rules that bear almost no resemblance to the
transplanted law that has replaced them in any number of areas. Yet through
this approach the state has seemed to grant legitimacy to all of the transplanted
law notwithstanding these differences, so long as it nowhere conflicts, not so
much with shari'a, but with a "certain ruling" or some similar standard
invented by the state of the vast corpus of shari 'a. This seems to grant wide
levels of control to the legislature in nearly all matters of law.
Or so one can assume. It is uncertain what the repugnancy clauses actually
mean, as the Western scholarship extolling the importance of these clauses far
outstrips the actual attention given to them in national courts, with the possible
exception of Egypt. There, the approach has been so ludicrously idiosyncratic
and odd that it hardly provides any sensible guidance in the development of a
consistent evaluative methodology.19 Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the
legal order, reliant as it is on the legal transplants to the derogation of the rules
of shari'a, does not seem to be in any danger. Such a state, it
" NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE (2008).
16 Larry CatA Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions: International andReligious Transnational
Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 11, 16 (2007).
'7 Intisar A. Rabb, "We the Jurists": Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 527, 527-28 (2008).
" See, e.g., Mohammad Fadel, Back to the Future: The ParadoxicalRevival ofAspirations
for an Islamic State, 14 REV. CONST. STUD. 105, 108-13 (2009) (reviewing FELDMAN, supra
note 15) (discussing broad discretion given to executive authorities in the classical era to deviate
from juristic determinations).
'9 See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Baghdad Booksellers, Basra Carpet Merchants, and the Law
of God and Man: Legal Pluralism and the Contemporary Muslim Experience, 1 BERKELEY J.
MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 83, 93-95 (2008) (criticizing recent decisions of the Egyptian Supreme
Constitutional Court); cf. CLARKB. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT:
THE INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI'A INTO EGY TIAN CONSTrrTUIONAL LAW 174-268 (2006)
(adopting a more sympathetic approach).
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seems-irrespective of its historical legitimacy, irrespective of how "Islamic"
it may be deemed under any given theoretical approach, grounded in classical
legal thought or otherwise-is not one based on the substantive rules of
shari 'a in any serious way.
More importantly, and acting as a corollary to the first point, is the fact that
precisely because the role ofshari 'a seems so limited under this conception of
the "Islamic state," it is not at all an accurate depiction of the role shari'a plays
in either Muslim politics or law when it is raised. That is, the principle of
repugnancy and broad legislative discretion is absolutely not the Islamist
position with respect to questions of personal status. One could imagine any
number of reforms that might well fit any theory of repugnancy-a required
payment of alimony, for example, to a wife for two years following the
dissolution of her marriage due to her husband's unilateral decision to divorce.
No rule exists among jurists explicitly banning such a practice, the jurists
merely declare that the three month iddah is the only required payment from
husband to wife following divorce.2" Islamist objection in Egypt to such a
provision, one of several in the widely ridiculed "Jihan's law," was fierce,21
and certainly my experiences in Iraq lead me to conclude that the Islamist
position is no less compromising there. The question has nothing to do with
what is or is not "repugnant"; the rules of Revelation are assumed to be the
only proper expression of God's law in the matter of personal status.22 The
Islamist adoption of an equally rigorous standard elsewhere, for example in the
law of contract or tort, is almost impossible to contemplate. Repugnancy, it
seems, is hardly applied in a manner that would make it remotely coherent as
a political theory of state organization.
To be clear, shari 'a-fication in a more consistent manner is possible in a
modem state; it is just not possible in a manner appealing to the Islamist. All
that it would take would be to repeal all law and empower judges simply to
apply shari 'a, or, perhaps, codify shari 'a and develop institutional controls to
ensure that the codification stayed faithful to shari 'a.23 The former types of
20 JOHN L. EsPosrro & NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, WOMEN IN MUsLIM FAMILY LAW 20 (2d
ed. 2001).
21 LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 169-70. See generally Dawoud S. El Alami, Law No. 100
of 1985 Amending Certain Provisions of Egypt's Personal Status Laws, I ISLAMIC L. &
Soc'Y 116 (1994) (discussing the provisions of"Jihan's law" including the minimum two year
compensation period in addition to the iddah when the man divorces the woman against her will
and without cause).
22 See infra Part III.C.3.
23 As Part II.C shows, quite a few scholars, beginning with the renowned Islamic studies
giant Joseph Schacht, have discussed the tensions between codification and the traditional
development of shari'a, with Schacht going so far as to say that to codify shari 'a necessarily
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systems, in particular, exist, though for the most part (not exclusively), they
tend to be in devastated societies where the catastrophic results of a wholesale
application of shari'a private law, for example, would hardly be felt given
more pressing problems.24  Beyond this, Muslim states, and Islamist
movements, are far too invested in their development to call for anything less
than a selective application of shari 'a, with the only real difference between
the Islamist, the moderate, and the secularist being precisely how much to
select. Logic and coherence, in the end, have been forced to give way to the
hard realities of our times, which cannot afford to Divinity the primary role in
the making of law.
Part H of this Article describes various approaches to making shari'a a
reality in modem nation states, emphasizing the selectivity of state processes
in giving voice to shari 'a. Part Ill sets forth the central reasons that Islamists
have chosen to continue this state of affairs, which in large part relates to the
fact that they enable Islamists to retain important parts of the transplanted law,
even as they Islamicize other areas. Part IV focuses on the repugnancy clauses
and shows that, far from demonstrating the primacy of shari'a in the
development of state law, the repugnancy clauses relegate shari 'a to a largely
inferior and minimal role and are, therefore, not the basis upon which Islamists
make legal claims on the basis of shari'a. Part V concludes with broader
implications of these considerations, specifically related to the role that shari 'a
is likely to play in Muslim nation-states in the years to come, and the role it
should be playing in the legal academy as it considers questions of law in
contemporary Muslim states.
distorts it. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO IsLAMIc LAW 100-01 (1964); see also
SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE CONSTITTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
SHIH_ AL-DINAL-QARFi, at xvii-xviii (1996) (discussing how codification necessarily replaces
the authority of the jurists with that of the state); WEISS, supra note 3, at 189 (discussing the
challenges of legal codification ofshari'a); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, The Shari'ah: A Methodology
or a Body of Substantive Rules?, in ISLAMiC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 177 (Nicholas Heer
ed., 1990) (discussing the history and codification ofshari'a). I take no position on the question
as it does not alter the thesis of this Article. Whether or not the codification of shari "a is or is
not, by necessity, a distortion ofshari'a, the fact remains that large portions of the legal systems
of the most thoroughly Islamized nations in the world are codified in a manner that derogates
sharply from shari'a.
24 See infra Part II.A.
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I. SHARI'A AND MUSLIM POLITICS
A. On the Nature of the Shari'a
Islamist notions concerning the necessity of applyingshari 'a in the state are
summarized succinctly and articulately in the following passage, written by
Ruud Peters, surveying debates in the field in the middle of the 1980s:
Why must Shari'a be enforced? . . . . Because the supreme
sovereignty belongs to God, man must submit to His will ....
Since the Shari'a is of divine origin, it is naturally superior to
any human law. The principles of the Shari 'a are immutable and
cannot, for that reason, become tools in the hands of despotic and
tyrannical rulers. For they, like all other Muslims, have to follow
the Shari 'a and cannot amend it at their pleasure as rulers can
where there is only man-made law.25
The position requires some elaboration. Certainly, it sounds sensible to
insist on the supremacy of God's law, as set forth in Muslim sacred text, but
the question nevertheless remains as to who is responsible for the
determination of God's law. That is, whose interpretation of this sacred text
is deemed to be authoritative and binding?
Ultimately, and omitting historical details of the early Islamic period not
relevant for our purposes, shari 'a developed into what the renowned Joseph
Schacht called a "jurists' law."26 Thus, the basic materials of shari'a in the
Sunni tradition are the extensive and oft conflicting rules laid out in the
manuals of medieval jurists from four schools of thought,27 whereas within
Shi'ism, the materials are similar juristic tomes, but prepared by currently
living high jurists operating from Naj af in Iraq and Qom in Iran.28 These rules
are not in any individual sense Divine Law, as any jurist is capable of
misapprehending or misinterpreting God's will, and even a casual look at the
tomes reveals deep and significant differences of opinion between the schools
on any number of matters.29 Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the compilations
25 Rudolph Peters, Divine Law or Man-Made Law? Egypt and the Application of the
Shari'a, 3 ARAB L.Q. 231, 244 (1988).
26 ScHACHT, supra note 23, at 209.
27 LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 16.
2' Haider Ala Hamoudi, You Say You Want a Revolution: Interpretive Communities and the
Origins oflslamic Finance, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 249, 267-69 (2008).
29 LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 17.
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of the orthodox schools are understood to be the corpus of shari'a.3°
Importantly, the jurists are not, and never have been, appointed by the state,
but rather operate within institutions independent of it, described as "guilds"
by the late George Makdisi in the medieval Sunni context.31
B. Organizational Necessities
Given the rather extensive material, the most direct way for any movement
to ensure that the law remains true to the body of shari 'a in any geographical
area would be to create a judicial class and entrust it with the task of applying
the volumes of material to all disputes appearing before it. With important
qualifications, this was the theoretical basis of the classical system.32 To take
the simplest example, in such a system, were a party to seek compensation
from another for harm done to her, she would bring her matter to the judge,
and the judge would consult the relevant manuals to see if the harm was
compensable. Several opinions may be present, in which case the judge may
have to apply one; or perhaps the state makes clear which of the schools of
thought has primacy, in which case the matter could at least in theory be more
easily resolved. If the defendant were to argue that, in fact, it was not him, but
a company in which he owned stock that caused the damage, and that,
therefore, he could not be held personally responsible, then our judge would
again consult the manuals, find nothing therein about limited liability or
separate corporate personhood,33 and dismiss such a defense as inconsistent
with shari 'a.
We could imagine in such a system, indeed we must imagine, that law might
evolve through reconsideration ofjuristic rules of medieval origin, by judges
applying such rules in new and creative ways, or by modern jurists reevaluating
the conclusions of their forebearers. This already occurs, even in the current
absence of shari'a supremacy over law. In the case of Islamic finance,
30 Id. at 16.
3, See JACKSON, supra note 23, at 103-04 (discussing Makdisi).
32 WEISS, supra note 3, at 187-88; Mayer, supra note 23, at 185. This broad, traditional
notion that the classical system regarded positive legislation by the state as lying in some tension
with shari'a as jurists' law has come under more sustained attack, as Part IV makes clear. In any
event, as this Article concerns the relationship ofshari'a to state law in the modem nation-state,
extensive ruminations on classical theory and classical law lie well beyond its purview. My
references to classical thought are therefore necessarily cursory and intended for illustrative
purposes only.
"3 See Timur Kuran, The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and
Persistence, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 785 (2005) (discussing the lack of standing for corporations in
classical Islamic law).
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classical juristic manuals are creatively read to develop theories that bear scant
resemblance to anything the classical jurists could have possibly imagined.34
In the case of slavery, the overwhelming Muslim consensus, on the basis of
sacred text, is that the practice is forbidden-notwithstanding detailed juristic
rules clearly permitting it.35
Reinterpretation of sacred text, as opposed to applying juristic rules in a more
creative fashion, might be controversial, and in some cases unnecessary, but
surely if the jurists are but mortal and fallible-a matter none in the modem
world would dispute-then the system may well maintain its coherence and
stability through such evolution. Reverting to new and fresh interpretations of
sacred text rather than relying solely on classical jurists, often described as the
fabled re-opening of the doors of ijtihad,36 is therefore entirely consonant with
the notion of shari 'a supremacy. Shi'ism, in fact, is predicated on the principle
that sacred text is supposed to be reevaluated by each generation of scholars.
That sect requires each individual Shi'i to follow exclusively those rules of the
single living high jurist who that individual Shi'i has determined is the most
learned; the opinions of dead men (and they are all men) are of no moment."
4 Hamoudi, supra note 28, at 255-58.
"5 Bernard K. Freamon, Slavery, Freedom, and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic
Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 53 (1998).
36 The literature on the "closing of the doors of itihad' is extensive and difficult to
summarize. Early Islamic studies scholars, including Joseph Schacht and Noel Coulson,
advanced the notion that, around the end of the first millennium C.E., a consensus was
established that independent judgment to determine the meaning of sacred text was forbidden
and that from that point forward, reliance was to be exclusively upon prior juristic
determinations as set forth in the rules of the four Sunni schools. This led to an ossification of
Islamic doctrine according to these scholars. SCHACHT, supra note 23, at 70-71; NOEL J.
COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 81-82 (1964). This has been challenged by later
scholars, most prominently Wael Hallaq, who suggested that jurists continued to draw their own
conclusions on the basis of sacred text long after the supposed closing of the doors. Wael B.
Hallaq, Was the Gate ofljtihad Closed?, 16 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 4 (1984). Others, such
as Sherman Jackson, accept the notion that ijtihad was far more limited following the first
millennium, but challenge the Schacht and Coulson position that ossification was a consequence
of the closed doors. Instead, creative jurists used an alternative form of authority, medieval
rules, in the place of sacred text to move shari "a forward in new and interesting ways. JACKSON,
supra note 23, at 73-79. Despite the rich contributions of Jackson and Hallaq to the literature,
the notion of the closed doors of itihad, and the supposed ossification resulting therefrom, has
been a repeated bane of Muslim reformists, who have insisted on reinterpreting Islamic rules
from sacred text rather than using the determinations of earlier jurists. See LOMBARDI, supra
note 19, at 83-84 (describing the efforts of the Egyptian modernist Rashid Rida). The
underlying point for our purposes, however, is that whether or not the gates to itihad are open
or closed, the same structural issues respecting the role of shari'a in the state will persist.
"' Hamoudi, supra note 28, at 267-68.
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Such a system is not only technically possible, but to some extent, exists in
the modem world. Saudi Arabia was formed precisely on such a basis, with
administrative authority belonging to the king, and the law of the land being
based on shari'a as interpreted by a puritanical strand of one of the four
orthodox Sunni schools known as Wahhabism. 3 8 While over the years there
have been important limitations on the model and a rise in edicts issued by the
monarchy, 9 certainly judges generally have the ability to pronounce rulings
based on shari'a.4° Hence, for example, a woman may be convicted of
witchcraft under the peculiarly Saudi version of shari "a on the grounds that
witchcraft, at least under the standards of evidence that were available to the
court, constitutes a "discretionary crime" without any statutory basis.4'
More generally, however, models of this sort are prevalent in entirely
devastated nations, such as present day Somalia42 or Taliban-run Afghanistan,43
which have suffered from the absence of civil society for decades. To use the
latter example, about which there is considerably more literature, it does seem
relatively clear that the Taliban officials responsible for enforcing law did at
least conceive of themselves as shari 'a authorities (however flawed) and did
apply that version of shari 'a liberally (and at times summarily) even in the
absence of specific legislative code, though the law included administrative
edicts from the Taliban central command as well."
Similar substate forms of quasi-law existed in Iraq when Sadrist forces
managed to seize control of Basra and areas of Baghdad, and Sunni extremists
took control of the Anbar. In areas under Sadrist control, doctors were brought
before "judges" who would often issue alleged shari 'a punishments for them,
including lashings, for such "crimes" as treating Sunni patients in a hospital.45
In the Anbar, quasi-judges used their own forms ofshari 'a to ban, among other
things, the sale of cucumbers and tomatoes together because of their sexual
38 ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 257-58 (1991); M.E. YAPP, THE
NEAR EAST SINCE THE FIRST WORLD WAR 189-90 (1991).
39 See, e.g., FRANKE. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAWAND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA,
at xiv (2000) (discussing the use of "decree laws" and "regulations" to create legal institutions
that appear modem and western).
40 Id.
4' Islamic Law in Our Times, Saudi Witches and the Shari'a, http://muslimlawprof.org/2008/
02/15/saudi-witches-and-the-sharia.aspx (Feb. 15, 2008, 17:50 EST).
42 FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 139-40.
John Bums, Taliban 's Taboos: Enforcers of Islamic Social Code Create a Minefieldfor
Afghanistan's Women, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 1997, at 8, available at 1997 WLNR 5770055.
4Id.
4- Islamic Law in Our Times, Stupidity and the Shari'a in Our Times, http://muslimlawprof.
org/2008/07/2 l/stupidity-and-the-sharia-in-our-times.aspx (July 21, 2008, 4:05 EST).
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suggestiveness.' Edicts were issued requiring the placing of diapers onto
goats because of their unusually large genitalia.47 For obvious reasons, the
revert of these regions to Iraqi government control has been broadly welcomed,
and the current Prime Minister has sought to take advantage of his reassertion
of control through renaming his own political movement the "Alliance for the
Nation of Law." ' He proved remarkably successful through this invocation
of law, relative to the more Islamic parties, judging by his performance in the
January 2009 provincial elections.49
The point of these examples, to be clear, in no way relates to the
substantive applications of shari'a; it is perfectly clear that shari 'a is capable
of far more sophistication than these various absurd applications would ever
suggest, and any glance at any juristic manual of any respected jurist, Sunni or
Shi'i, will reveal a depth of thought that far outstrips these imaginative
idiocies. The point, rather, is that in each system of state or quasi-state
organization, inherent to it is the rigorous quasi judicial application of law
understood, one must assume sincerely, to be shari'a.
C. Origins of Codification in the Muslim World
Nevertheless, the primary means of giving life to shari 'a in the modem
state has been through codification."0 There has been a lively and fascinating
discussion within Islamic studies literature concerning the extent to which the
very process of codification is ipsofacto a distortion of shari 'a. This debate
usually centers on modem efforts by Islamists to enact shari 'a as code rather
than empower judges to simply refer directly to shari 'a.l Those arguing that
the coherent codification of shari'a is impossible rely on the fact that, in the
words of Joseph Schacht, the shari'a is "a doctrine and a method" which
cannot be made into a single, uniform legal code without distortion. 2
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Posting of Haider Ala Hamoudi to Islamic Law in Our Times, Islam and the Alliance for
the Nation ofLaw, http://muslimlawprof.org/2009/01/25/islam-and-the-alliance-for-the-nation-
of-law.aspx (Jan. 25, 2009, 13:48 EST).
'9 Islamic Law in Our Times, Caprice and the Shari'a: Translated Qurans and Nations of
Law, http://muslimlawprof.org/2009/02/15/caprice-and-the-sharia-translated-qurans-and-nations-
of-law.aspx (Feb. 15, 2009, 20:40 EST).
'0 JACKSON, supra note 23, at xvi-xvii.
"' See, e.g., id. (outlining differences between traditional shar'a and codified shari'a);
Mayer, supra note 23, at 181-82 (providing a history of codification attempts).
52 Joseph Schacht, Problems of Modern Islamic Legislation, 12 STUDIA ISLAMICA 99, 108
(1960).
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As a result, most accounts of the Muslim codification phenomenon begin
with a description of the Mecelle." At the end of the nineteenth century, in the
late Ottoman period, a law commission headed by Ahmet Cevdet Pasha
promulgated what was intended to be a Muslim civil code,54 covering nearly
all areas of private law except family law" and acting as the template for any
number of nations following the dissolution of the empire.56 The ultimate
effect of the enactment of the Mecelle in weakening the powers of the juristic
class is a matter much reported,57 as was its influence in paving the way for a
broader codification phenomenon.58
In point of fact, however, the Mecelle is not terribly interesting as an
exercise in the potential perils of codification in the modem Islamic state, and
the issue of the shari'a as method is largely orthogonal to a more central
question concerning the primacy of God's Law. Obviously codification can
be said to distort the very basis of the shari 'a as ajurist's law, not as a positive
product of the state, regardless of the substance of what is enacted.59 However,
when the rules that are ultimately enacted are themselves based on juristic
thought, at least some justification can be attempted on the theory that the
caliph has some discretion to select which of the conflicting rules of juristic
opinion shall be followed.6° It could be argued that the Ottomans have done
nothing more than this in their enactment of the Mecelle.6" One rising scholar
has made precisely this argument.62 Moreover, sufficient institutional controls
could well be put into a state, through a Council of Guardians, for example, to
ensure that the legislation that is based on shari 'a remains that way.63 A decent
53 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 23, at 181-82.
" See Seval Yildirim, Aftermath of a Revolution: A Case Study of Turkish Family Law, 17
PACE INT'L L. REV. 347, 353 n.22 (2005) (stating that "Cevdet Pasha, the main proponent and
the architect of the Mecelle, found support for codification...").
" See generally THE MEJELLE: BEINGAN ENGLUSHTRANSLATIONOFMAJALLAH EL-AHKAM-I-
ADL1YA AND A COMPLETE CODE ON ISLAMIC CIVIL LAW (C.R. Tyser et al. trans., 2001)
[hereinafter MECELLE] (including several areas of private law, but excluding family law).
56 AN-NA'IM, supra note 4, at 17-18.
57 See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 63-64 (discussing how codified rules deprived the
scholarly class of power by assuming final authority over the content of the law).
58 See, e.g., AN-NA'IM, supra note 4, at 17-18 (discussing how the Mecelle led to the
creation of the Egyptian Civil Code of 1948).
59 See Mayer, supra note 23, at 177-78 (discussing the quote of Schacht regarding the
distortion of shari'a by codification).
o See LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 50-51 (discussing how a ruler can place limits onjuristic
opinion by demanding that rules be taken only by decisions of a specific guild).
6' Fadel, supra note 18, at 118-19.
62 Id.
63 CHmBu MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF IsLAMIc LAW 94-95 (1993).
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claim to Islamicity, and divine supremacy in matters of law, might well be
made if all of this were done. In any event, this Article takes no position on the
rich debate concerning whether or not the codification of the rules of the
shari 'a is absolutely incompatible with the notion of shari 'a.
More devastating to the notion of God's law reigning supreme is the fact
that, from the outset of the codification phenomenon, there has been no real
attempt of any significant kind to codify all law along the lines of shari 'a. The
fact is that Mecelle is the last of the Ottoman legal reforms known as the
Tanzimat, preceded as it was by a penal code, a property code, a commercial
code, a commercial procedure code, and a maritime code, all modeled almost
entirely on Napoleonic law.' Which is to say that, contemporaneous with
codification, and indeed preceding it, was the phenomenon of secularization
of the content of the law. As Schacht himself noted, this becomes far easier
to achieve once the state, and not shari 'a enunciated by the jurists, becomes
the authority that pronounces law."
The process in fact seems inevitable. Once codification becomes the means
by which law is created, it becomes terribly tempting for the state actors, when
faced with a legal problem that the shari 'a is not capable of solving, to simply
alter the legislation, transplant law from Europe, and conveniently shunt aside
God's law. Only politics prevent such a move, and political influences are not
always firmly on God's side. As a result, divergence from traditional shari 'a
rules was an inherent part of the codification process in the Muslim world.
Forms of partnership and organization, rules of property and admiralty, and
even criminal rules, were introduced without the slightest shari'a
precedent-transplanted from France (and, in the case of property, Germany)
even before the Mecelle had been enacted." This is far more relevant to the fall
of God's law than the matter of the Mecelle. It would be possible to at least
claim to give supremacy to God's law in a land of codified shari'a; the matter is
much harder when that law has been replaced with European transplant.
Unsurprisingly, as the shortcomings of shari 'a to govern vast areas of law
became ever clearer, this process of secular codification only accelerated. The
fate of the Mecelle is possibly the most interesting example. Though billed as
a civil code, the Mecelle is not a code as any civilian lawyer would understand
the term.67 Most importantly, there is no general theory of obligation.68 Even
64 COULSON, supra note 36, at 151-52.
65 SCHACHT, supra note 23, at 101.
66 COULSON, supra note 36, at 151-52.
67 Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: Its Sources, Substance, and Sundering, 16 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'Y 1, 8 (2006).
6' Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity of
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a general theory of contract is absent from the Mecelle.69 The Mecelle instead
divides the area of contract 70 into a series of nominate forms, among them sale,
hire, partnership, and agency, each with its own rules-leaving one to wonder
as to whether contracts that do not fall neatly into any given category will be
enforceable, and if so, under which set of rules.7 Tort is likewise divided into
categories, such as destruction of property and usurpation; a general theory of
negligence is absent. 72  This form of atomistic organization effectively
obliterated any hope of the Mecelle operating as a code in the manner of a
continental civil code, because it neither internally referenced itself, nor were
its general provisions applicable in a manner that ensured internal consistency
Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. CoMP. L. 423, 438-39 (2008).
69 Id
7 There has been much debate among Islamic Studies scholars as to the extent to which the
shari'a, as reflected in the juristic manuals, allows for freedom of contract. Schacht and
Coulson, for example, have both taken the position that there is not so much a law of contract
within Islam as a law of contracts, and that while Islam may well permit freedom within the
nominate forms, it cannot be said to permit a freedom to contract beyond this. NOELJ. COULSON,
COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE GuLF STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL TRADITION 17, 27-31 (1984);
SCHACHT, supra note 23, at 144. Other work has pointed out potential limitations on this. Baber
Johansen, for example, has shown through careful studies of one school of thought that while
commercial exchange was certainly never discussed as a separate book within any juristic
manual, certainly jurists did distinguish between it and contracts that reflected social
arrangements mediated through kinship, such as marriage. Baber Johansen, Commercial
Exchange and Social Order in Hanafite Law, in LAW AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: PAST AND
PRESENT 81,81-95 (Christopher Toll & Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen eds., 1995). Jeanette Wakin
has done excellent work on the means through which jurists negotiated the divide between theory
and practice with respect to one particularly troublesome rule within the juristic manuals: the
requirement that a contract be oral and the concomitant denial of a writing as having any legal
authority of any kind. Jeanette A. Wakin, Introduction, in THE FUNCTION OF DOcuMENTS IN
IsLAuc LAW 1, 6, 10-11 (Jeanette A. Wakin ed., 1972); see also PAUL R. POWERS, INTENT IN
ISLAMIC LAW 100 (2006) ("Freedom to contract is generally supported in Islamic law, and the
various rules governing contracts and commerce function to provide the parameters of this
freedom."); Hussein Hassan, Contracts in Islamic Law: The Principles of Commutative Justice
and Liberality, 13 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 257 (2002) (arguing that the nominate form system was not
intended to and did not in fact restrict freedom to contract). It is not my intention to enter into
a very fascinating debate respecting the function and role of shari'a in regulating commerce in
the classical era or whether it provides for or inhibits "freedom of contract" as an abstract matter.
As one who approaches these texts first and foremost from the point of view of a contemporary
commercial law scholar, instead I raise the rules of the juristic manuals for one purpose: to
demonstrate that as written, without a general theory of contract or general rules of contract, and
without any allowance for a joint stock limited liability vehicle, they cannot reasonably operate
as the basis of any contemporary commercial system. Of this conclusion, I am confident.
"' Hamoudi, supra note 68, at 438, 439 n.65.
72 See MECELLE, supra note 55, at 137-47.
[Vol. 38:293
THE DEATH OF ISLAMIC LAW
across the entire Mecelle.7 3 There are other substantive difficulties with the
Mecelle. It lacks any concept of legal personhood.74  Limited liability
companies are not among the forms of business organization that the Mecelle
suggests may be formed through contract.75 The partnerships it does describe
dissolve upon the death of any single partner, at least as concerns the share of
that partner.7 6 It is hard to conceive of any modem society being able to
govern itself by such rules, and indeed the Ottomans had already incorporated
French law to address some of these shortcomings, including the adoption of
the Napoleonic company law.77
It is important to note that the drafters of the Mecelle, in addition to being
some of the most respected minds in the Ottoman Empire, had considerable
compass in determining the code's content from the disparate rules of the
medieval jurists. While the Mecelle purported to draw primarily from one of
four Sunni schools of thought, it consciously adopted rules from any one of the
three other schools when it found them convenient.78 At times, when pressed,
as in the nearly universal shari'a limitations on stipulations varying the
nominate forms of contract, it adopted the view of a single jurist of a single
school-and even then on a highly contentious reading-to the derogation of
all other jurists.79 Yet despite this considerable latitude and the drafters'
considerable prowess, in setting down the disparate rules into a single code,
the drafters could do no better than this.
If a judicial class were responsible for the enforcement of uncodified
shari'a, or if shari'a were codified with institutional controls designed in a
manner that prevented its easy amendment, then these problems could only be
overcome through the process of evolution of thought concerning prohibitions
and permissions of the shari 'a. This could be undertaken either by the judges
through clever reinterpretation of what thejurists actually meant, or by a living
juristic class extending shari'a in ever more changing directions. This is
obviously always a possibility, as Timur Kuran properly notes in his work on
the inhibitive role that Islamic doctrine has played at times in Islamic history
in developing commercial institutions and vehicles.8° But given that no
" Stigall, supra note 67, at 8.
74 See MECELLE, supra note 55, at 166-210.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 222.
77 COULSON, supra note 36, at 151.
78 AN-NA'IM, supra note 4, at 17.
7' Hamoudi, supra note 68, at 445-47.
80 Timur Kuran, The Scale of Entrepreneurship in Middle Eastern History: Inhibitive Roles
of Islamic Institutions 21-24 (Econ. Res. Initiatives at Duke, Working Paper No. 10, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1265117.
20101
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
principle of intrinsic shari'a primacy exists, an easier route is readily
available-the code can simply be changed. As a result, the Mecelle was
slowly but nearly entirely eclipsed throughout the following century. I In the
Arab world, for example, it was largely replaced by a civil code drafted by the
brilliant and renowned Arab jurist Abdul Razzaq al Sanhuri 2 While the
Islamicity of Sanhuri's Code is and has been a matter of intense debate,"a far
too extensive and nuanced to engage here, it is fair to say that Sanhuri's Code
is not, as the Mecelle was, an attempt to set down particular rules of the
shari 'a on the basis of the derivations of jurists from the four Sunni schools
of thought. It was, at most, an exploration of some of the supposed
fundamental principles of these medieval Sunni rules, informed heavily by
Roman law and Continental European law, and containing some provisions in
clear derogation of shari 'a-at least as understood by modern Muslims. 8  It
is moreover a code in the civilian sense; it is internally consistent, has
extensive provisions concerning obligation and contract, and preempts the
entire area of private law beyond personal status.8 5 Many of its provisions are
virtual translations of European codes. 6
There is no doubt that some Islamic concepts remain-the waqf, which
operates in the Civil Code largely as a land trust, is perhaps the most obvious
and extensively discussed single feature of shari 'a.7 Nevertheless, the Civil
Code is a substantial and significant departure from the Mecelle, and a turn
towards Continental Europe in a manner that renders the shari 'a, in large part,
less relevant than it had been.8
If this is true with respect to the Sanhuri Civil Code, it is emphatically more
so with respect to company laws throughout the Muslim world, which by and
large endorse the notion ofjoint stock limited liability companies with separate
personhood, notwithstanding the fact that the shari'a never recognized such
8" See AN-NA'M, supra note 4, at 17 (discussing codes subsequent to the Mecelle).
82 Id. at 17-18.
83 ENID HILL, AL-SANHuRi AND IsLAMIc LAW 71-83 (1987) (describing the scholarly debate
at length and taking the position that the Civil Code was in fact more Islamic than is commonly
believed); cf J.N.D. Anderson, The Shari'a and Civil Law: The Debt Owed by the New Civil
Codes of Egypt and Syria to the Shari 'a, 1 ISLAMIC Q. 29 (1954) (describing the Code as more
European than Islamic). For a contemporary contribution, see Amr Shalakany, Between Identity
and Redistribution: Sanhuri, Genealogy and the Will to Islamise, 8 IsLAMIc L. & Soc'Y 201
(2001).
8 LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 92-99.
85 Hamoudi, supra note 68, at 439.
86 Id.
87 See, e.g., Stigall, supra note 67, at 17-19 (describing the waqfin the Iraqi Civil Code).
18 See AN-NA'WM, supra note 4, at 18 (discussing departures of Sanhuri's Code from strict
rules of shari 'a).
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a form of commercial organization. 9 Likewise criminal law, constitutional law,
and financial law have all been (largely, with notable exceptions discussed
below) transplanted from Western sources in a manner that preempts and
obliterates previously existing laws. This can be done either through the
enactment of a code, in the civil law context, or, for nations ultimately adopting
common law under English influence, through the enactment of statutes and the
gradual use of English common law to decide cases in civil courts.9"
With the adoption of secular transplanted law, other secularization
processes-the bureaucratization of state function, the extension of central
authority, and, most importantly, the professionalization of the
judiciary--quickly followed.9' As a result, judges in nearly all Muslim states
are trained in professional law schools,92 and their training is in law of the
civilian or common law variety, as the case may be, and not shari'a.93
Certainly in my own experience in various parts of the Middle East-from
Qatar to Jordan to Iraq-the interest of aspiring scholars in a foreign law
degree far exceeds any interest in shari a.
It was therefore only time and distance that made the juristic manuals ever
more obsolete as Muslim states enacted more and more by way of transplant and
paid less and less attention to shari'a. Vast areas of private law, for example,
from the laws of partnership and agency to the rules of tort, have been so
transformed as to render shari'a largely obsolete in them.' This is to say
nothing of the entire reorganization of criminal law along transplanted lines,95
with significant exceptions to be discussed below. In fact, as scholars such as
Bernard Weiss and Lama Abu-Odeh point out, the only area of law in which
shari 'a remains both broadly and deeply influential, both in rulemaking and
application, is that of personal status law.96
9 See Kuran, supra note 80, at 16 (discussing how Islamic law does not cover the concept
of legal personhood).
" See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform
and the Theory ofLegal Change (pt. 1), 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 256-58 (1994) (describing this
process of evolution in Malaysia); Edward R. Leahy & Mark D. Davis, National Banking Laws
Governing the Rights and Responsibilities of Non-resident Depositors, 19 INT'L LAW. 1119,
1144 (1985) ("Under Pakistani law, the fundamental rights and obligations of bank depositors
are not very different from those prevailing in the United States. Pakistan inherited its legal
system from the British, and its substantive laws still bear the imprint of English common law.").
91 RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW 103-05 (2005).
9 See Abu-Odeh, supra note 3, at 791 (discussing the author's own law school education
in Jordan).
93 Id.
9 WEISS, supra note 3, at 188.
9 CoULsoN, supra note 36, at 152.
9 WEISS, supra note 3, at 188; Abu-Odeh, supra note 3, at 791-92.
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I1. ISLAMIST RULE AND THE SECULAR PROJECT
A. Islamist Acceptance
One can imagine why secularist elements within Muslim society might very
well welcome broad change along such lines. More perplexing, however, is
why Islamist movements have come along for this ride. For while it is
apparent that Islamists are quite often unhappy with the state of the law as it
exists, and seek something that purports to be based more closely on the
substantive rules of shari'a, Islamists do not seek to disturb the central
principle of selectivity. The Islamist desire, then, to "sharia-fy" is to change
the state law to bring it closer to shari'a norms in certain areas, but not others.
Nevertheless, selectivity does not seem to prevent the Islamist from insisting
that shari'a is the only legitimate law because it is God's, and God's judgment
is superior to humanity's, even as the Islamist ignores his own claim in any
number of areas of law. This reveals a confounding jumble of rhetoric and
reality that at first glance seems difficult to unpack.
Modem models do exist for approaches that are more comprehensive and
consistent. Saudi Arabia is perhaps the most notable example of a state
granting wide power to a judicial class to apply shari'a.97 Given that Saudi
Arabia has proven remarkably adept at exporting much of its Wahhabist
ideology through the liberal use of petrodollars,9" it might come as some
surprise that Islamist movements seem barely interested in replicating it-aside
from the devastated society examples of Afghanistan and Somalia.99
One explanation could be the relative weakness of the Islamist movements
in some cases for any number of reasons. Thus, for example, while Egypt's
Islamist Muslim Brotherhood may well have considerable popular support, the
movement itself is technically banned and certainly does not wield power.' 00
It could therefore be argued that given this situation, the wholesale
reorientation of the state is not an option and therefore the movement is forced
to compromise, at least temporarily, on its long term ambitions. The Islamists,
97 See supra Part II.B.
98 KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFr 72 (2005).
99 See supra Part I.B.
"00 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Jailing 800 Activists Casts Doubt on Elections,
(Mar. 29,2008), http://www.hrw.orglen/news/2008/03/29/egypt-jailing-800-activists-casts-do
ubt-elections (describing the arrest of at least 148 would-be candidates for the 2008 municipal
council and local elections, and noting that the Muslim Brotherhood has been banned in Egypt
since 1954).
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under this theory, field candidates where they can and seek to maximize
influence where possible.'0 '
However, Islamist weakness is not a useful explanation for why Islamism
has chosen the path of selective codification, because even when Islamist
regimes manage to acquire sole power, as in the case of Sunni Sudan or Shi'i
Iran, or when they have a friend in power, as in the case of Pakistan,'1 2 the
clear trend remains in favor of selective codification.0 3 In fact, aside from the
devastated society, neither Islamists nor average Muslims seem particularly
enthused about the prospect of entire rule by shari'a. All seem to have
adopted well the notion that the state determines which portions of God's law
deserve recognition, even as the Islamist insists, however incoherently, that
shari 'a cannot be subverted by human will.
Unfortunately, this matter has not received very much attention. Most of
the focus on Islamist lawmaking tends to address, not the more interesting
question of the perduring power of the transplant, but rather the Islamist
penchant for codification of what was once uncodified shari'a. Thus, for
example, in explaining why it is that Islamists prefer the codification ofshari 'a
and what this might mean for the future of sharia, the renowned scholar Ann
Elizabeth Mayer posited an explanation regarding power dynamics; namely,
that if an Islamist party were to seize control of a government, that party would
then be obviously reluctant to cede considerable levels of the power it had just
obtained to a scholarly-minded judicial class to which it might not necessarily
belong-and codes ensure that the power remains with the state." This
continues to be a widely accepted explanation.'0 5
While this makes sense, a larger question, which Mayer does not address,
looms. This is why Islamist forces, even in thoroughly Islamized states such
as Iran, not only rely on codification in order to bring the state in closer
conformity with shari'a, but also in large part use the same process of
codification to derogate from shari'a in favor of the continuation of
transplanted law-even when the scholarly class is itself in control of the state,
and has developed extensive legal rules that bear no resemblance to the
transplant. This curiosity is the subject of the next section.
101 See id.
102 Hamoudi, supra note 4, at 101.
103 For specific examples in the area of criminal law, see PETERS, supra note 91, at 155-69
(discussing the present state Islamic criminal law in Pakistan, Iran, and the Sudan).
"0 Mayer, supra note 23, at 182-83.
105 See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 109-11 (discussing the replacement of shari 'a
scholars with ordinary Muslim laymen in the interpretation ofshari'a); JACKSON, supra note 23,
at xvii (stating that any attempt to codify involves replacing the authority of the jurists with that
of the state).
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B. Understanding Selectivity: The Case of Iran
Unlike Sunnism, where the scholarly classes suffered significant reversals
at the dawn of the colonial era, 6 the juristic institutions of Shi'ism are alive
and thriving.' 7 Specifically, and in brief, Shi'i doctrine requires each Shi'i to
select among a certain, small group of high jurists the jurist that she considers
the most learned, to follow the rules established by that jurist to the exclusion
of all others, and to tithe a significant portion of her income to him.' Jurists,
who operate primarily from two centers, Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran, then
compete for followers, even as they train the next class ofjurists beneath them.
Those jurists-in-training become high jurists in their own right once they reach
a particular level of scholarly capability and publish a multivolume
comprehensive work known as the risala, containing the substantive rules of
shari 'a as derived by them.0 9 Generally these compilations cover all areas of
private law, from rules of purchase and sale to family law (and are quite
extensive on ritual), but do not engage issues of public law. "0 They are meant
to guide the believer to live in accordance with God's will (which necessarily
makes public law considerably less relevant). Thus, until the rise of the
Islamist movement, Shi'i elements preferred less to confront the state than to
ignore it, waiting instead, as per Shi'i eschatological doctrine, for a lineal male
descendant of the Prophet, known as the Mahdi, to reemerge from hiding,
where he has been for over a millennium, and institute just rule."'
Beginning in the 1960s, however, two influential clerics, Muhammad Baqir
al-Sadr and Ruhollah Khomeini, began to assert that such quietism was
unwarranted and that the proper Islamic path was for Muslims to seize control
of the state pending the reemergence of the Mahdi.12 Naturally, as scholars,
the most logical protectors of the shari'a to their mind once control was seized
were the jurists themselves.' The idea, as coined by Khomeini in a series of
lectures in Najaf (though it must be said that Sadr was responsible for much of
,0 LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 73.
107 See Hamoudi, supra note 28, at 267-68.
108 Id.
09 Id at 268-69; see also Devin J. Stewart, The Portrayal ofan Academic Rivalry: Najaf and
Qum in the Writings and Speeches of Khomeini, 1964-78, in THE MOST LEARNED OF THE
S1H'A 216 (Linda S. Walbridge ed., 2001) (discussing the position of high jurists).
110 Hamoudi, supra note 19, at 110-11.
. Abbas Amanat, From Itihad to Wilayat-i Faqih: The Evolution of the Shi'ite Legal
Authority to Political Power, in SHARI'A: ISLAMIC LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 120,
122-23 (Abbas Amanat & Frank Griffel eds., 2007).
12 MALLAT, supra note 63, at 71-75.
113 Id.
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the underlying theory), was known as "Guardianship of the Jurist.""' 4 Both
Sadr and Khomeini realized that the highly decentralized structure of the
seminaries, where each jurist operates independently of the other, required
some adjustment. They made this adjustment in the form of a central, leading
jurist, a Supreme Leader, under whose authority the state would be organized,
while other jurists would operate in subsidiary positions, retaining tithing
followers and training academies but with less control over law." 5
This would seem to make the transplant largely unnecessary. Certainly the
compendia had extensive rules of private law."6 One could simply refer judges
to the compendium already written by the Supreme Leader to find all necessary
rules concerning, for example, contract, tort, and permissible business
organizations, or a new code could be enacted that does nothing but repeat the
rules already developed. Khomeini himself suggests as much in one of the best
known compilations of his writings and speeches, Islam and Revolution.1"' In
one notable portion, Khomeini derides the drafters of transplanted law as wasting
time and "worship[ping] foreigners" because shari 'a already has the necessary
answers as to "[t]he entire system of government and administration."' " The
severe rhetoric should not be gainsaid; Khomeini has likened the enactment of
transplants (worshiping foreigners) to idolatry-an act described in the Qur'an
as one for which no forgiveness is possible." 9
One therefore wonders why, when the 1979 Islamic Revolution took place
in Iran, and Khomeini became Supreme Leader, a significant role remained for
the transplant.12° To be sure, the Iranian Constitution adopts a series of
institutional controls to ensure that all legislation is carefully vetted by the
juristic classes to ensure Islamicity. The juristic classes also have supervisory
authority over the Iranian President, suggesting levels of executive juristic
control far greater than any court exercising judicial review.' 2' However, this
did not prevent the continuation of a civil code, for example, in largely the
same form it had been before the Revolution. 22
..4 Id. at 59 (discussing wilayat al-faqih, which can be translated as "Guardianship of the
Jurist").
"I Id. at 75-76.
116 Hamoudi, supra note 19, at 110-11.
17 KHOMEINI, supra note 1, at 126-49.
"8 Id. at 137.
119 THE HOLY QuR'AN 4:48 (Chapter of the Women) ("And God shall not forgive the
polytheizing of Him, and He forgives all but that to whom He wills, but he who has worshiped
others has committed a mighty sin." (author's translation)).
20 Mayer, supra note 23, at 191.
121 MAULAT, supra note 163, at 80-81.
2 Compare Qanun-i Madani [Civil Code] 2007 (Iran) (Mostafa Shahabi trans.) (post-
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This is quite remarkable. Having taken over the state, on the theory of
juristic rule, and having insisted that the law of the state must reflect the well-
established and extensive rules of shari 'a, the juristic classes decided to retain
a transplanted civil code rather than establish the shari 'a private law rules they
had themselves developed over a period of decades.
The same confusion emerges from the seminaries in Najaf today. I have
had the privilege of speaking extensively with one of the most intelligent men
I have met in Najaf, Sheikh Bashir Al-Najafi, one of Iraq's Four Grand
Ayatollahs.'23 He has emphasized repeatedly that Islam as a legal system is
superior to all other legislative systems because it is not "reactive," in that laws
are not issued in Islam in response to whatever political need may arise, but
rather the rules lie in Sacred Text, and have been for the past fourteen
centuries, awaiting discovery by the careful scholar. As to why, if this was the
case, Sheikh Bashir, along with his contemporaries in Najaf, most prominently
Sayyid Ali Sistani, likewise emphasized their strong desire not to involve
themselves with the state affairs in Baghdad, I could never get a satisfactory,
nor even coherent, answer, even from the otherwise brilliant Sheikh Bashir.
Needless to say, if Islam has the rules, and the jurists are spending their lives
"discovering" them, it seems only sensible that some effort be made by
someone to put those rules into practical effect in Shi'i majority Iraq, rather
than leave them to collect dust in the seminaries in Najaf.
One need look no further than the juristic rules of any high jurist, from Ali
Sistani of Iraq to Ayatollah Khomeini himself,24 to develop a reasonable
explanation for why these rules are not seriously considered as worthy of state
implementation. Much like the Mecelle, juristic rules are compilation and not
code; they are a collection of atomistic rules, rather than an internally
referenced and coherent body of sections that are intended to work together to
govern an entire area of law. To take the simplest example, in the compendia,
contracts are divided into nominate forms with separate rules governing each. 25
Revolution Code), with Qanun-i Madani [Civil Code] 1973 (Iran) (Musa Sabi trans.) (pre-
Revolution Code).
123 Discussions with Sheikh Bashir AI-Najafi, in Najaf, Iraq (Oct. 20, 2009).
124 The compendium of Ayatollah Khomeini is available in English translation. AYATOLLAH
KHOMEIIm, A CLARIFICATION OF QUEsTIONs: AN UNABRIDGED TRANSLATION OF RESALEH
Towzit AL-MASAEL (J. Borujerdi trans., 1984) [hereinafter KHOMEINI RISALA]. Grand
Ayatollah Sistani's compendium is widely sold in Arabic in Iraq. ALl SisTANi, MINHAJ AL-
SALIHEEN (13th prtg. 2008), available at http://www.sistani.org/local.php?modules'nav&nid'2&
bid'24 [hereinafter SISTANI RISALA]. While the two are remarkably similar, I make reference to
both in order to emphasize that the primary shortcomings of the juristic rules do not vary
according to the jurist in question.
125 SISTANIRISALAsupra note 124, at vol. 2, 21-429 (dividing contracts into nominate forms,
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For the same reason that the Mecelle was ultimately discarded, this would be
difficult to use in a society with even the slightest level of economic
development. If one forms a contract with another party that does not seem to
fall within the nominate forms, is it enforced? If so, to what extent? Under
what rules? The answers are unclear, and will remain so absent a general
theory of contract.
The Civil Code of Iran addresses this problem because it contains broad
and general provisions concerning contract. The relevant section concerning
contract validity generally, Article 190, appears to be the same now as it was
in 1974-before the Revolution had taken place. It reads as follows: "For the
validity of the contract the following conditions are essential: 1. The intention
and mutual consent of both parties to the contract. 2. The competence of both
parties. 3. There must be a definite thing which forms the subject matter of
the contract. 4. The cause of the transaction must be lawful."' 126
This is not a juristic rule; nothing in the juristic rules attempts to address
contract validity along such general lines. Instead, this is precisely the civilian
standard for validity; a virtual translation of the French Code Civil.'
12 7
The same exercise could well be undertaken concerning partnerships and
corporations, where again the juristic rules do not sanction anything
approaching a modern corporation. Instead, they seem to assume partnerships
among natural persons that seem fairly limited in scope and duration. 28 Yet
Iran has a commercial code, enacted after the Revolution, and its first article
specifically authorizes the creation of joint stock limited liability
and analyzing each under separate rules); KHOMEINI RISALA, supra note 124, 2051-2362.
126 Qanun-i Madani [Civil Code] 1973, art. 190 (Iran) (Musa Sabi trans.) (pre-Revolution
Code). The English translation of the most recent version of the Iranian Civil Code reads
similarly: "For the validity of any transaction the following conditions are essential: 1. Intent and
consent of the parties. 2. Capacity of the parties. 3. A definite subject which is the object of the
transaction. 4. Legitimacy of the purpose of the transaction." Qanun-i Madani [Civil
Code] 2007, art. 190 (Iran) (Mostafa Shahabi trans.) (post-Revolution Code). The differences
appear to be a matter of translation.
127 See CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1108 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/
codestraduits/codeciviltextA.htm#CHAPTERII-OFTHEESSENTALREQUESTS ("Four
requisites are essential for the validity of an agreement: The consent of the party who binds
himself; His capacity to contract; A definite object which forms the subject-matter of the
undertaking; A lawful cause in the obligation.").
.28 See, e.g., SISTANI RISALA, supra note 124, at 161-209 (describing various forms of
partnership); KHOMEINI RISALA, supra note 124, 2142-2159, 2228-2250 (same, but in less
detail). For a broader treatment of this in the context of Sunni classical rules, see generally
Kuran, supra note 80.
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vehicles-another obvious foreign transplant that is not present in the Islamic
rules that Khomeini had insisted were entirely comprehensive.'29
Now that the jurists are in control, why has Iran continued to "worship"
foreigners through such transplants? At the very least, why haven't the
institutional controls meant to assure juristic rule been deployed to prevent the
enactment of material of obviously Western origin? None of the explanations
offered by leading scholars to date seem very helpful. The problems with the
approaches to date, it seems, is that they fail to take account of Llewellyn's
well-known adage to law students to be distrustful of whether decision makers
in fact know the relationship between what they say and what they do. 3°
Rather than simply assume that Islamists want God's Law to reign supreme
because they keep saying it, Iran seems to provide an alternative, more direct
explanation, based less on rhetoric and more on substance. Islamists do not
want juristic rules to govern in every instance; rather, they want, as much as
anyone else, to be selective in determining which rules apply.
A brief consideration of the options available to harmonize the law of
contract with the juristic rules of Shi'ism's high scholars illustrates the basis
of the Islamist desire for selectivity.
1. The Devastated Society
The easiest way for the Islamist forces in Iran to achieve absolute
consistency would be to do away with codes entirely, and thereby obliterate a
general theory of contract, a joint stock limited liability commercial vehicle,
and anything else that was not reflected in the juristic compendia-particularly
when it is of foreign origin. Alternatively, the state could simply enact
Khomeini's compendium, at least as it concerns private law, and grant
Khomeini, or some class ofjurists, the sole ability to change it-or at least to
approve changes to it. In the devastated society model, something along these
lines might well be possible. Of all the problems Somalia faces today, the
inability of a merchant to enforce a contract in court beyond the nominate
forms is comparatively less important. This might help explain why devastated
societies have had an easier time of abandoning codes and transplanted
concepts altogether, thereby giving primacy to their own highly contested
versions of shari 'a.31
29 Majmua-hi Kamili Qava'nini Va Muqarra'ti Bazergani Va Tijari [Code ofthe Commercial
Laws and Regulations] Tehran 1370 [1990] art. 1 (Iran) [hereinafter Iran Commercial Code].
130 LLEWELLYN, supra note 2, at 7.
13' Another explanation is available--one offered by the excellent work of Timur Kuran on
the subject of the role of shari'a in fostering or inhibiting Muslim commerce over time. The
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Beyond the devastated society, however, this option hardly seems plausible.
It is hard to believe that the Iranian jurists, for example, or at least some of
their economic advisers, would not be concerned with the damage done by the
repeal of a general theory of contract and its replacement with a rule that every
contract take one of several nominate forms. The Civil Code must remain, the
Commercial Code must be enacted, and thus this option, conceptually the
simplest, is foreclosed.
2. The "Discovery" of Transplanted Concepts
A second option would be for the jurists to "discover," to their amazement,
that, in fact, sacred text has all along adopted a general theory of contract, and
that its elements are consent, capacity, cause, and lawful object. The curious
similarity to the civilian standard might well be explained by the allegation that
the civilians must have somehow stolen it from earlier Islamic civilizations, or
by the fact that the civilians have learned by trial and error that which Islam
knew all along. Again in Najaf I have heard from sharp rising scholars, such
as Sayyid Ja'afar al-Hakim, a general endorsement of this latter notion. To
quote Sayyid Ja'afar more precisely, "the theoretical processes of discovery in
Najaf correlate closely with the praxilogical processes of experimentation in
countries of advanced development."'
3 2
Beyond, Najaf, Sanhuri develops his general theory of obligation, and a
general theory of contract, on the basis of a supposed careful reading of the
underlying principles of the shari 'a, as laid out in the four Sunni schools of
thought. He ends up determining that these principles-nowhere actually
discussed-are in fact Roman ideas of obligation.' In addition, in a far less
intellectually sophisticated fashion, books on Islam written for the layperson
are replete with allegations that ideas of clearly Western origin, ranging from
democratic rule'34 to legality in criminal matters, 35 are in fact originally
Islamic. These ideas can gain currency in the Muslim world, and far be it for
shari'a rules, as difficult as they might be in a developed, complex society such as Iran's, are in
fact well-suited to a milieu wherein most transactions are personal, and entrepreneurship is on
a smaller scale. Kuran, supra note 80, at 3. Given this, even were Islamists in Somalia keen to
encourage commercial enterprise, the juristic rules are not necessarily bad ones under the
circumstances.
132 Discussions with Sayyid Ja'afar Al Hakim, in Najaf, Iraq (Oct. 21, 2009).
133 See LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 92-99 (discussing Sanhuri's neo-taglid method of
drafting Islamic legislation).
134 NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY
53-54 (2003).
' Hamoudi, supra note 68, at 435-36.
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me to object to such salutary developments for reasons no better than
historicity.
Yet surely there are limits to the viability of a practice of this sort. Even if
the civilian standard of contract validity were to be developed, would the
Ayatollahs then find authority for the joint stock limited liability vehicle?
Could a negligence standard be so justified? There will come a point at which
the jurist's ability to credibly adopt transplanted notions and deem them
Islamic in origin will come to an end. Indeed, it was the overwhelming
influence of transplanted law in Sanhuri's Civil Code that led to its being
dismissed by many Islamists in its time as not being Islamic enough.'36
3. Parallel Development
A third option would be for jurists to attempt to develop shari 'a so that it
employs a more progressive set of rules concerning not only contract, but
commercial concepts generally, that would neither be transplants nor an
economic disaster. Rather, they would be well-functioning, yet different
enough to claim Islamicity, rooted as they would be in the Muslim tradition
and based on values, such as social justice, with ample reference in Muslim
sacred text. It was an aspiration of this sort that led to the rise of the so-called
"Islamic economics" movement, led by Sadr, among others, in the middle of
the twentieth century.'37 It clearly sought to liberate Muslim doctrine from its
hidebound past, yet locate in it an alternative form of economic and social
order that was both Islamic and independent of the West.'38 The title of Sadr's
crowning work on the subject, Our Economics, betrays this fundamental aim,
contrasting "Muslim economics" with its capitalist and communist
competitors. 139
The effort never really succeeded largely because, as Timur Kuran has
indicated in any number of absorbing pieces on the subject, it was driven less
by a coherent and sensible economic theory and more by the need to establish
an independent Muslim identity.4 ° An independent form of economic
organization that may compete with the dominant global paradigm seems even
136 LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 98.
"' Hamoudi, supra note 28, at 250-52.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 252, 273.
'4 TINMJR KURAN, ISLAM AND MAMMON: THE ECONOMIC PREDICAMENTS OF
ISLAMiSM 82-102 (2004); Timur Kuran, The Discontents ofIslamic Economic Morality, 86 AM.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROc.) 438, 438-39 (1996); Timur Kuran, The Genesis of Islamic
Economics: A Chapter in the Politics of Muslim Identity, 64 Soc. RES. 301, 301-05 (1997).
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more implausible now, as commercial laws across the globe have become
increasingly uniform and less tolerant of deviation.
That said, there are some limited prospects for the success of parallel
development. For example, Islamic economics did manage to spawn the
practice of Islamic finance, which is far more conservative and therefore
compatible with global demands than its revolutionary predecessor. 4' In
essence, Islamic finance mostly replicates conventional financing techniques
as closely as possible while purporting to avoid prohibitions on money interest
and excessive speculation.'42 As a result, the legal changes necessary to
implement an Islamic finance system do not require wholesale reorganization
of private law or even commercial law. In fact, the practice often relies on the
use of New York or English law in order to ensure that agreements made in
accordance with its principles are enforceable, suggesting that Islamic finance
may expand for years to come without any changes at all in state law.'4 3
In this sense, Islamic finance is an interesting practical example of a theory
of legal change first raised by Professor Donald Horowitz in the context of the
Islamization of Malaysian family law. Horowitz showed how Malaysian
courts, following a process of Islamization, not only approached the
interpretation of shari 'a from distinctly common law biases, but effectively
syncretized common law and shari 'a in a manner that brought the two legal
systems together without necessarily casting doubt on the authenticity of the
latter.' The syncretization process, whereby the revolutionary ideas of
Islamic economics were taken by persons more familiar with conventional
economics and developed into an Islamic finance practice more harmonious
with global expectations, seems to be at work here as well.
It is possible, indeed likely, that over the process of decades, the same
theory of legal change might well lead to a collapsing of shari 'a notions into
conventional ones, so that shari'a would still apply, but in a manner that did
not cast doubt on its authenticity through wholesale transplant. Yet the process
would hardly be appealing given the rather severe consequences that would
attach to Iran's economic and commercial interests, at least in the short term.
141 Hamoudi, supra note 28, at 250.
,42 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad's Social Justice or Muslim Cant?: Langdellianism and
the Failures of Islamic Finance, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 89, 90-91 (2007).
143 Umar F. Moghul & Arshad A. Ahmed, Contractual Forms in Islamic Finance Law and
Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems N.V. & Ors.: A FirstImpression
of Islamic Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 150, 189-90 (2003) ("Parties to Islamic finance
transactions often assert English or New York law as the governing law relying on the
probability that the contracts are more likely to be enforced as written.").
Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the
Theory of Legal Change (pt. 2), 42 AM. J. CoMP. L. 543 (1994).
2010]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
It is one thing to work through interpretations of sacred text concerning
polygamy over a period of time in order to develop rules that in fact syncretize
common law and shari 'a. It is quite another to obliterate a civil code and a
commercial code and wait for jurists and judges to develop tools and
techniques that will bring ideas like a general theory of contract or a limited
liability commercial vehicle back into existence through reapplication of
ijtihad. The short term consequences of such an approach would be dire,
particularly given broad global expectations concerning the substance of
commercial law in particular.
C. Selective Codification and its Consequences
All of the above options have been employed in one fashion or another. As
we have seen, absolute rejection has been used in the devastated society, the
supposed Islamicity of transplants works well with notions like democratic rule,
and Islamic finance is a good example of something like parallel development.
Each, however, is limited in its applicability and feasibility, leaving the Islamist
with a single option (or at least a single easy option)--to dispense with trying to
faithfully do what he says concerning the supremacy of God's law and instead
simply adopt the transplant. This then allows the Islamist to develop the state
law using some mixture of transplanted and juristic concepts, and avoid any
direct justificatory efforts for the transplant.
Under this approach, the Islamist does not need to actually try to demonstrate
where the general theory of contract comes from in any detail, and the difficulties
of parallel development or transplant discovery do not present themselves.
Instead, the state may operate, rhetorically, as "Islamic" but in fact, through the
establishment of a separation between the institutions that proclaim the shari'a
(the juristic academies, or lay scholars, as the case may be) and those that
proclaim the law (the state and its legislatures), the Islamist may select what of
God's law he happens to like, and enact only that. The following section outlines
the vast realm within which Islamist selectivity along these lines operates beyond
the single question of Iran and its Civil Code.
It should be noted that while I believe that the reluctance to adopt shari 'a
private law seems to stem largely from economic concerns, I do not attempt any
comprehensive explanation as to why some areas of law within the paradigm
appear favored over others. I am certain any number of economic or
sociological theories might be drawn to explain the method in the seeming
madness of the legal selectivity phenomenon, and I look forward to further
studies on the subject. For purposes of this Article, however, the point is that
the very existence of selectivity lies in clear tension with the Islamist claim
that God, and not man, should be responsible for rulemaking.
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1. The Obsolescence of Shari 'a Private Law
In the area of private law (other than personal status), shari 'a has become
largely obsolete. In the Arab nations, for example, the Sanhuri Civil Code has
not only managed to survive several decades, but it has also spread and
developed such deep and lasting legitimacy that it is no longer seriously
questioned, even by Islamists. While a very small number of provisions might
well be subject to attack from time to time (among them, provisions permitting
the taking of interest on a loan),'45 the basic elements of the Sanhuri Civil
Code, its general theories of obligation, contract and negligence, for example,
are not subject to dispute.'46
Thus, in Iraq, where Islamists managed in 2005 to secure a clear majority
of voters (even if they are divided among Sunni and Shi'a parties), the notion
that the Civil Code needs amendment has yet to be raised in any capacity in
which I, as an adviser on the Iraqi constitutional and legislative process, am
aware. No jurist has been able to explain to my satisfaction how Sanhuri's
Code, in force in Iraq,'4 7 can possibly be reconciled with juristic rules, nor
have they even attempted to do so. The division between law, as product of
the state, and shari'a, as product of the jurist, allows them to avoid the
question.
Likewise, the Sudan adopted its 1984 Civil Transactions Code a year before
its Islamic coup, and yet despite the enactment of other Islamic laws (to which
I shall turn soon), the Code, largely based on Sanhuri's Code, remains in force
complete with recognition of legal personality for companies, 1 a general
theory of contract, 4 9 and broad general provisions5 ° reminiscent far more of
Continental Europe than the Mecelle.
Beyond the Arab world and the influence of Sanhuri, much the same is true.
Pakistan was subject to Islamist coup when General Zia ul-Haq assumed power
in 1977, killing the democratically elected Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the process.
Though legislative changes discussed below did take place, the Contract Act
of 1872 remained, and remains, in full effect, despite its having been enacted
when Pakistan was still a British colony. 5' Any one of my American law
145 Peters, supra note 25, at 234-35 (describing objections to interest in Egypt).
146 Id. at 237-38 (noting Islamist proposed adoption of commercial code that is not based on
shari 'a).
147 Stigall, supra note 67, at 13.
148 QANUNAL-MUAMALAT AL-MADANIYA LI SANA [Civil Transactions Law of 1984] arts. 17,
23 (Sudan), available at http://www.sudanlaws.net/downloadslaws/moaamalatl.pdf.
14 Id. art. 33.
150 Id.
151 Jared M. Lee, Pakistan's Political Upheaval: The Demise of a Nuclear Democracy, 17
2010]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
students will instantly recognize in it the common law system of contract, with
its requirements of offer, acceptance and, most peculiarly to the common law,
with no civilian or Islamic counterpart, consideration.'52
2. The Near Universal Transplantation of Company Law
If this is the case with private law generally, it is emphatically more so with
commercial law. Professor Kuran notes that the idea of a joint stock limited
liability vehicle has no antecedents in shari'a.'53 I find this interesting, and
even more so, that no Muslim nation and no Islamist movement to my
knowledge (again, excluding devastated societies) has sought to alter the
transplant. Even in the most thoroughly Islamized nations, the trend is
precisely the reverse.
Iran's Commercial Code permits the creation of joint stock companies of
limited liability,'54 as does the Sudan.'55 Even Saudi Arabia, which continues
to allow its judges, graduates of shari "a seminaries and thoroughly versed in
the Wahhabist strain of shari'a, to decide matters according to uncodified
shari 'a,"'56 has been forced to adjust this traditionalist shari'a system, and take
a step in favor of the measured incoherence of the broader Islamist movements
in the Muslim world to accommodate a transplanted commercial system. The
settlement of commercial disputes in the Saudi Arabian Kingdom are not
undertaken by the shari'a judiciary, but by a professionalized commission
acting under the authority of the King, not the clerics. The rules employed are
Royal Regulation in place of shari'a and they adopt clearly transplanted
concepts such as limited liability. 57 The state is thereby seeking to limit the
role of shari'a in this realm.
More important than the actual substance of the law, however, is the trend,
precisely in the opposite direction of "shari 'afication" in this area, even when
Islamist groups are in charge. To the extent that the Sanhuri Civil Code might
contain some shari 'a influence, and to the extent that Saudi Arabia remains
largely an isolated, and limited, exception to the broader rule respecting
obsolescence of shari'a in private law, the more important point is that no
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 177, 177 (2007) (indicating Pakistan became independent of Great
Britain in 1947).
152 The Contract Act of 1872, art. 10 (Pak.).
See Kuran, supra note 33, at 785-86 (noting that before 1851 joint stock companies were
unknown in Islamic law).
114 Iran Commercial Code, supra note 129, art. 1.
155 QANUN AL SHARAKAT u SANAT [Company Law of 1925] art. 4 (Sudan).
156 VOGEL, supra note 39, at xiv.
,5' NIDHAM AL SHARAKAT [Regulations for Companies] art. 48 (Saudi Arabia) (as amended).
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Islamic movement, including the Sunni Islamists who control the Sudan, 58 the
Shi'i Islamists who control Iran,'59 or the Islamists, Sunni and Shi'i, who have
become leading voices in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein, seek the
Islamization of private law and the withdrawal of developments such as the
Sanhuri Civil Code. Nothing along these lines has been seriously put forward
by influential Islamists in other nations as well, such as Egypt,' 60 suggesting
that even as interest in Islam has consistently risen across the Muslim world
since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, interest in Muslim private law has
waned considerably. It is not on the agenda of the movements, which simply
would not be possible had the movements been forced to take seriously their
rhetorical claim that the shari'a must reign supreme in Muslim land.
3. The Obsession of Personal Status
While most of shari 'a private law seems well on its way to obsolescence,
such is not the case with personal status law (composed primarily of law of the
family and inheritance), where Islamists insist that the rules must be based
entirely on shari'a, with any reform being dismissed as some sort of
unacceptable deviation. Any number of examples may be brought: from the
storm of protest that followed the relatively modest reforms in Egypt known
as Jihan's Lawl6' 61 to the severe objections to the 1974 Marriage Law in
largely secular Indonesia.'62
To offer a stark, recent example from Iraq, Shi'i Islamists sought to repeal,
almost immediately after the removal of Saddam from power, the Personal
Status Code and replace it with uncodified shari'a.'63  Though widely
publicized as returning women to second class status while they had enjoyed
near equality under Saddam's Code, in fact the Personal Status Code was
already based largely on shari 'a. " Nevertheless, for reasons probably relating
158 QANUN AL SHARAKAT L SANAT [Company Law of 1925] art. 4 (Sudan).
159 Iran Commercial Code, supra note 129, art. 1.
6 Peters, supra note 25, at 237-38.
161 LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 169-71. Among other things, Jihan's Law entitled a woman
to a divorce if her husband took a second wife, granted a woman a right to two years of alimony
beyond the three months required by shari'a, and increased rights of custody for women. Id.
at 170.
162 See Mark Cammack et al., Legislating Social Change in an Islamic Society-Indonesia 's
Marriage Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 45 (1996) (noting the resistance to the Marriage Act and the
resulting effects of its passage).
163 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative Process and State
Authority in Post-Invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 523, 543-44 (2007).
'64 Id. at 544-46.
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to a juristic assertion of power, Iraq's Islamists immediately sought to bring
law into conformity with shari'a through code repeal, and then through
specific statutory authorization to permit judges alone to apply shari 'a. '65 As
Iraq was not even sovereign at the time but rather under U.S. control, the effort
quickly fizzled.'66 However, nerves were frayed to the point where one
prominent Shi'i Islamist led a Shi'i walkout of a meeting of the body of Iraqis
advising the U.S., known as the Governing Council, in protest of a planned
attempt to overrule a former recommendation of repeal.'67 The attempt to
repeal the Personal Status Code, at least for those who wish to be governed by
shari 'a, remains a top legislative priority for the Islamists with whom I speak
regularly, as well as for the jurists in Najaf.
By contrast, and as alluded to above, the notion of repealing Sanhuri's Civil
Code has not been mentioned once, even though its changes from shari'a are
far more significant. Moreover, the fact that the Iranian Civil Code has
remained largely intact even following the Revolution suggests that the Shi'a
Islamists are hardly interested in repealing their own civil code. Even
measures that are far more controversial among Islamists elsewhere, such as
the paying of interest on a loan, hardly seem to garner Islamist attention in
Iraq. The same Islamist who led the walkout in protest of the personal status
issue, Adel Abdul Mahdi, successfully negotiated a considerable reduction of
Iraq's debt with the Paris Club, which led to an agreement by Iraq to obligate
itself to a diminished, but very real, continued payment of interest. 6 ' Only
personal status, it seems, raises Islamist fury in Iraq.
4. Islamic Criminal Law
The Islamist agenda in criminal law lies somewhere between the near entire
neglect of commercial law and the obsession of personal status. Libya,
Pakistan, the Sudan, Iran, and some Muslim dominated regions of northern
Nigeria, among others, give some role to shari'a in their criminal law. 169
Nearly all of these codes address the issue of fornication, 7 ° and it is of little
165 Id. at 546.
166 See Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making andRemaking of the Iraqi Legal System,
36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 748-54 (2004) (discussing the history of personal status law
in Iraq and the 2003 effort to return the law to uncodified shari'a).
167 LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY 172 (2005).
16' Hamoudi, supra note 163, at 534 n.56.
169 See PETERS, supra note 91, at 142-85 (discussing the reintroduction of Islamic criminal
law, including its application to a legal system that was essentially Western).
170 Id. at 150 (Saudi Arabia), 154 (Libya), 156-57 (Pakistan), 162 (Iran), 166-67 (Sudan),
171 (Northern Nigeria).
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surprise that religious conservatives in the Muslim world are as curiously
fixated on illicit sex as their counterparts around the world. Beyond this,
however, there is considerable variation, both in scope of application and
emphasis. In a nation such as Libya, where a professional judiciary schooled
in transplanted law has been left to apply those Islamic crimes that have been
codified, there has been little, if any, actual enforcement of the criminal codes
respecting shari'a. 1  In Pakistan, much the same is true except for
enforcement of blasphemy laws that are designed to target a religious minority
that is a particular bane of the Pakistani Islamists-the Ahmadiyya, who claim
to be Muslim but also believe that there is an Apostle after Muhammad.'
17 2
Government corruption seems to have been a higher priority in the Sudan,
where shari'a rules of theft are extended so far as to encompass acts of
embezzlement.'73 In Iran, the first focus of attention following the Revolution
was political crimes, tried under shari'a.'74
The case of criminal law also demonstrates amply that selectivity of
"shari'afication" by Islamist forces spans not only areas of law, but also
geography. In fact, the role of shari'a in the area of criminal law depends not
only on the relative strength of Islamist forces, but also on the relative priorities
of their respective selective legislative agendas. The Islamists of Pakistan, Iran
and the Sudan have seemed rather aggressive and broad in their approaches,
seeking a prominent role for shari 'a in any number of areas. By comparison, and
perhaps on the other extreme, Iraq's Islamists, have comparatively little on their
public legislative agenda in terms ofshari 'a beyond personal status, save, at least
for the Shi'a Islamists, ensuring seats on the Federal Supreme Court for
appointees of the jurists of Najaf. This more limited agenda may be attributed
to dependence on American influence and support, and divisions between the
Sunni, the Shi'a, and the generally secular Kurds.'75 Certainly, criminal law
has not been mentioned by the Iraqis at all in any prominent capacity. Hamas
seems likewise relatively unconcerned with a broad legislative agenda.'76
Regional Islamist parties in Indonesia probably lie somewhere between these
,"I Id. at 155.
172 Id. at 158, 160.
173 Id. at 166.
114 Id. at 160-61.
'71 Posting of Haider Ala Hamoudi to Islamic Law in Our Times: Fundamental
Misunderstandings of Law and Islam in Iraq, http://muslimlawprof.org/2008/09/29/sharia.aspx
(Sept. 29, 2008, 8:29 EST).
176 Ian Fisher et al., Palestinians Debate Shades ofIslamic Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006,
at A12.
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two poles-more committed to aspects ofshari'a than Iraq's Islamists, but also
limited in the amount of shari'a they wish to, or can, adopt.'77
IV. THE INCOHERENCE OF REPUGNANCY
A. The Theory of Repugnancy
The supposed salvation to the incoherence oflslamist legal selectivity often
comes in the repugnancy clause of various Muslim state constitutions. This
clause, either as enacted or as subsequently interpreted by the judiciary,
requires that all law conform to something equivalent to the core tenets of the
shari'a. Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court has declared that a 1980
Amendment to the Constitution indicating that the principles of the shari 'a are
the main source of legislation has this effect,'78 and the constitutions of both
Afghanistan and Iraq have more explicit provisions requiring conformity. The
Iraqi Constitution's Article 2 prohibits legislation that conflicts with the
"certain rulings" of Islam, the rights granted in the Constitution, and the
principles of democracy. 79 Afghanistan's Constitution goes further, voiding
legislation that conflicts with the "beliefs and provisions" of Islam. 80
With this, some form of Islamicity is assumed to return to state structure.
Under this approach, the juristic manuals may well reflect shari 'a, yet the law
is permitted to deviate from that, and even adopt transplanted law, so long as
it does not create some sort of irreconcilable conflict with shari 'a. Certainly
scholars in our legal academy seem to think that this trend towards repugnancy
clauses portends increased focus on shari'a in the Muslim state. Rabb and
Lombardi offer nuanced and careful portrayals of the phenomenon they call,
respectively, "Islamic constitutionalism" and "constitutional Islamization" in
the specific contexts of Iraq and Egypt, but leave no doubt that these trends
signify something important about the increasing role of Islam in the state.''
Larry Backer has also commented on the rise in "theocratic constitutionalism,"
using repugnancy as one example of this broader epiphenomenon.,82
Moreover, some scholars have begun to challenge the traditional notion that
the juristic rules that form the corpus of the shari 'a ever were, by necessity,
17 Moch. Nur Ichwan, The Politics of Shari'atization: Central Governmental andRegional
Discourses of Shari 'a Implementation in Aceh, in ISLAMIC LAW IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA:
IDEAS AND INSTTrUTIONS 193, 210-15 (R. Michael Feener & Mark E. Cammack eds., 2007).
178 LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 167.
179 IRAQ CONST. art. 2 (author's translation).
110 AFG. CONST. ch. 1, art. 3.
... Rabb, supra note 17, at 528-29; LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 1.
"82 Backer, supra note 16, at 16, 39-43.
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the rules on which the legal order was based. One scholar has suggested that
wide compass was granted to the caliph under classical constitutional theory
to enact legislation so long as it conformed to particular notions of the public
interest and did not violate consensus determinations of the jurists.'83
Lombardi has raised similar ideas in his work on the Supreme Constitutional
Court in Egypt.'4 Finally, Asifa Qureishi suggests in her work that there is an
interplay between caliphal determination and shari'a that expands the
possibilities of transplanted legislation considerably, again so long as certain
public interest indicia and consistency with broad notions ofshari 'a are met.8 5
Might then the Islamist project be resurrected on the basis of such ideas?
Not likely, for the reasons provided below.
B. The Islamic State, Without Islamic Law
Perhaps the most important point to make about the repugnancy clauses is
that, to the extent that they posit an "Islamic State," it appears to be one largely
divorced from Islamic law, rather than some vague notion of Islamic values.
This may well be legitimate from a historical perspective or under some other
theory, but it hardly portends the rise of Islamic law, so much as the non-
shari 'a based Islamic state.
Under the repugnancy approach, God's law has been reduced from lengthy
and extensive rules in virtually all areas of law into a series of limited
prohibitions and grants of permission unrelated to one another that operate
against a separate, transplanted legal system. I do not wish to enter the fray
and voice any opinion in these few lines on whether the classical system
actually countenanced something akin to this-namely, the right of the
legislature to obliterate shari 'a entirely, preventing resort to it subject only to
some vague notion of public interest as well as absolute prohibitions contained
in shari'a, whatever those may be. I will only say that if this is actually a
classical theory, then it would perhaps be a mistake to suggest as I have, that
shari'a died with the advent of the colonial era. Perhaps it would be more
accurate to state that the shari 'a never lived at all, as its relevance in the actual
legal order seems remarkably small.
Iraq provides the best example of the limits of repugnancy. Article 2 of the
Iraqi Constitution reads in relevant part: "A. No law may be enacted that
183 Id. at 39-40.
'u LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 47-54.
185 See Asifa Quraishi, Who Says Shari'a Demands the Stoning of Women? A Description
of Islamic Law and Constitutionalism, 1 BERK. J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 163 (2008)
(discussing the interaction between shari'a, the caliph, and the public good).
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contradicts the certain rulings of Islam. B. No law may be enacted that
contradicts the principles of democracy. C. No law may be enacted that
contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this Constitution."' 6
It is hard to see how any theory in which God's law is supposed to be
supreme could be reconciled with a clause that puts God's law, when
sufficiently established, on equal status with rights and freedoms established
by man's law. God's law under this approach is no more or less important
than the constitutional right to learn Aramaic in public school, which is a
separate constitutional right.
8 7
These clauses are, in addition, at times given more attention than they
deserve in terms of their use to meaningfully change the legal order to reassert
the primacy of God's law. Iraq's repugnancy clause, for example, has received
attention from any number of respected scholars.' Noah Feldman goes so far
as to use the constitutional scheme to demonstrate the primacy of shari'a in the
new legal framework.8 9 All of this attention, ironically enough, concerns a
provision that has not been interpreted even once in Iraq by the nation's highest
tribunal despite rulings and advisory opinions in dozens, and perhaps hundreds,
of other constitutional matters over the past five years. 90 One would think that
were repugnancy to have such a profound effect on law and legal order in Iraq,
the courts would have begun providing some level of definition to it by now.
It is true that the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court has a long history
of interpreting its own repugnancy clause. ' I have always been deeply
skeptical of the quality and consistency of the Court's reasoning, for reasons
that need not be recounted here. 192 However, it suffices to say that repugnancy
in Egypt does not herald the end of the transplant. In fact, the Court decided
in one of its earliest cases that laws in force prior to the amendment of Article 2
in 1980, wherein repugnancy was established, could not be challenged in court
186 IRAQ CONST. art. 2 (author's translation).
187 Id. art. 4.
188 Backer, supra note 16, at 47; Rabb, supra note 17, at 535-40.
189 FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 2-4.
190 In my current role as a consultant on a project to revise the Iraqi Constitution, I have had
occasion to read through the extensive opinions of the Iraqi Supreme Federal Court, available
in Arabic at http://www.iraqijudicature.org.
'91 See LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 174-269 (outlining the history, application, and
reception of Egypt's Article 2 jurisprudence).
192 See Hamoudi, supra note 19, at 94-97 (explaining the court's inconsistent application of
its principles).
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on the grounds of repugnancy.'93 Nearly all transplanted law is, therefore,
immune from constitutional challenge.
C. The Irrelevance of Repugnancy to Shari 'a Debate
Even more importantly, whether or not the state, with transplanted codes
and repugnancy as so understood, may be deemed an Islamic state under some
set of norms, such a view of the relatively marginal role of shari'a is entirely
inconsistent with the position of Islamists, who demand considerably more
shari'a conformity in certain areas. One need look no further than to the
vociferous Islamist objection to Jihan's Law, a piece of legislation advocated
by Egypt's former President Sadat as a means to advance women's rights in
Egypt. 4 One of the provisions to which there was so much objection was the
obligation of a man to provide alimony for his wife for a period of two years
following a divorce. 95 Yet no jurist has suggested that a man cannot support
his wife for two years, only that the shari 'a obligation terminates after three
months. 96 To be sure this law constitutes a wealth transfer from one private
party to another beyond that contemplated by the shari'a, and thereby
establishes a theory of corrective justice that the shari'a nowhere recognizes,
but this hardly seems to qualify under the higher bar of "repugnancy."
After all, a worse criticism might be leveled against a transplanted law of
negligence because it frees a party from an obligation to pay for a damage that
she may well have not been required to pay under shari 'a. That is, the juristic
texts make a party liable for causing a direct injury to another irrespective of
intention or negligence (including, for example, striking someone with a car
under circumstances where the injury could not reasonably have been avoided
by the driver). Commentaries of Muslim countries that have adopted
negligence point this out, and then point out it has been dropped in favor of a
theory of negligence originating in Roman law.'97 Yet these provisions of
193 Rector of the Azhar Univ. v. President of the Republic, [1985] (Egypt), reprinted in
Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt) -Shari 'a and Riba: Decision in Case No. 20 of Judicial
Year No. 1, 1 ARAB L.Q. 100, 104 (1985).
'9 LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 169-70. Among other things, Jihan's Law entitled a woman
to a divorce if her husband took a second wife, granted a woman a right to two years alimony
beyond the three months required by shari 'a, and increased rights of custody for women. See
generally El Alami, supra note 21, at 116 (discussing Jihan's law).
195 LOMBARDI, supra note 19, at 170.
196 Esposrro, supra note 20, at 20.
'9' See, e.g, 1 ABDULMAJIDALHAKIM, ALWAJIZNADHIUYATALILTIzAM [THE SUMMARY
OF THE THEORY OF OBLIGATION] 218 (1980) (indicating that under Islamic Law all direct injuries
are compensable while Iraqi law adopts the French theory that intent or negligence is necessary);
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modem civil codes are, as this Article has pointed out, uncontested. The
conclusion is that in tort, certain transfers of wealth that God's law requires
may be ignored in favor of Western rules, yet the silence of God's law on
particular wealth transfers in family law cannot be supplemented with man's
law. No theory of repugnancy can possibly coherently incorporate this
incredible discrepancy.
Even starker examples are available. Even as the Iraq Civil Code permits
the taking of interest, and Islamist members of the cabinet accept the principle
of the payment of interest, Islamist desire with respect to personal status in Iraq
is quite different. It is not merely to deny the legislature the latitude implied
by repugnancy in enacting legislation, it is to strip the legislature of any control
over all matters of personal status, directing judges instead to apply the shari 'a
in its uncodified form.19 8
V. LAW AND EXPERIENCE IN THE BROADER MUSLIM WORLD
A. The Future of Shari'a
That there is an incoherence to the Islamist view of the role of shari 'a in
the state does not preclude considerations of future paths to the shari'a.
Inconsistency in logic is fundamentally different from idiosyncratic
unpredictability, and given the obvious and durable preference for selectivity,
one might well be able to make some prognostications for the relationship of
shari 'a to law in the Muslim world in the years to come.
First, it seems relatively obvious that the broad divergence in shari'a
adoption across both subject matter and geographical location in various
Muslim states will only increase with time. It is perfectly clear, for example,
that even as Iran adopts a post-Revolution Commercial Code that relies
heavily on transplanted ideas,'" and even as Saudi Arabia manages to wrestle
commercial disputes out of the hands of religious authorities, 2°0 the trend in
personal status in Iraq appears to be in the other direction.2'
Likewise, the broad diversity of agendas that selectivity permits Islamist
movements to bear will continue, or even increase. When Islamists are able
see also ABDUL RAZZAQ AL SANHURI, AL WAJIZ FI AL HADHlRIYA AL-'AAMA LIL ILTIZAM [THE
SUMMARYOFTHEGENERALTHEORYOFOBUGATON] 320-21 (2004) (describing Western origins
of theory of negligence).
198 Hamoudi, supra note 163, at 543-46.
'9 Iran Commercial Code, supra note 129, art. 1.
200 VOGEL, supra note 39, at 304-05.
20' Hamoudi, supra note 163, at 543-44.
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to succeed by coup or revolution, as in the Sudan2 °2 or Iran, °3 they have a freer
hand in operations and tend to implement considerably more. Yet for every
Sudan and Iran, there is a Hamas-popular, violent, and inspiring to the
Muslim imagination because of its association with resistance to colonialism,
of which Zionism is seen in much of the Muslim world as a premier
example.2' However, Hamas is severely limited in its legislative agenda given
the primacy attached to conflict with Israel, the continuing political and
military competition with Mahmoud Abbas and his more secular Fatah
movement, and a substantial secular (not to mention Christian) population.05
The use of the shari'a as a vehicle of resistance against the West and its
perceived client, Israel, serves Hamas well, but a proposal to stone adulterers
would not.
Second, the selective adoption of shari 'a in a manner that both confronts
the West in spectacle, while remaining broadly faithful to global expectations
respecting commerce in particular, is only likely to continue. The trend of
resistance to perceived Western imperialism, and the anger induced thereby,
extends far beyond the simple question of Israel. The term muqawama, or
resistance, has become something of a mantra for various revivalist groups
notwithstanding the fact that the term has no Islamic pedigree.0 6 The notion
that the shari'a can provide an independent form of order, thereby enabling
Muslims to establish an authentic and legitimate alternative to the hegemonic
West runs strong.20 ' While few movements would in fact cause significant
economic damage to themselves by taking such rhetoric seriously, other,
largely symbolic acts of resistance are likely to continue. Homosexuality, for
example, is likely to remain deeply repressed, and anything suggesting of
sexual freedom commonly associated with the West-whether that be the veil,
interactions between the genders, or co-education is likely to remain
controversial. The stoning of adulterers may be the most dramatic means of
expressing an identitarian distinction from the supposed decadent and
licentious West, but it is hardly the only one.
Finally, diversity in the manner in which shari 'a is applicable extends well
beyond what may be enacted as state law. The main role that shari'a plays in
the lives of ordinary Muslims is through the extensive rules on ritual and
202 Abdullahi An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality Of Human Rights: The Case of
Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11 EMoRY INT'L L. REv. 29, 58-59
(1997).
203 See supra Part III.B.
204 Hanoudi, supra note 68, at 464-65.
205 Fisher et al., supra note 176.
206 Hamoudi, supra note 68, at 463-64.
20" Hamoudi, supra note 28, at 251.
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worship, none of which receive very much recognition by way of state law.2 °8
In addition, Islamic finance thrives most often through the use of legal systems
that claim no adherence to the shari'a of any kind.2 9 The practice has
continued to expand unabated. 21" Aside from Islamic finance, other merchant
communities will likely continue to rely on their own informal rules, derived
largely from shari 'a, in regulating their own commercial practices.21" It is one
thing to suggest that the wholesale adoption ofshari 'a private and commercial
law would be disastrous for a national economy, but it is another to suggest
that small, insular merchant communities will not be able to engage in their
own self-policing beyond state regulation in a manner that relies more heavily,
though not exclusively, on shari'a.
It is, in the end, quite difficult to know, with any degree of reliability,
precisely how important shari 'a will be in the Muslim states in the years to
come. However, one thing has become absolutely clear. The idea that God
must legitimize the state and that the law of the state can only be deemed
acceptable if somehow in conformity with God's law, as reflected, however
imperfectly, in the juristic manuals, is a notion of the past. While shari'a
continues to play a role in the modem Muslim state, it is but one of many
influences in the tumultuous, politicized, state-driven process through which
law is made and interpreted. The idea that its role should be anything more
prominent than this, that it should, in other words, be the standard by which the
state operates, exclusively or even primarily, is, in practice even if not in
rhetoric, dead. Some may lament its passing, others may celebrate it, but as
scholars, more than anything else, we must recognize it.
B. Shari'a in Our Scholarship-The Brooding Omnipresence
The notion here presented, that logic does not give life to the law, and that
there is a distinction that can be discerned between the actions of decision
makers and their words, is, of course, hardly unique to the Muslim world. In
fact, for all the criticisms that might be made of Islamic movements, it is not
a failing of Islamists that their legal theory is fundamentally incoherent, as no
other choice avails itself. They cannot demand the significant retraction of the
state's transplanted law over shari'a, in light of the many areas where the
20' For an extensive treatment of such rules in the Shi'i tradition, see generally SISTANI
RISALA, supra note 124, at vol. 1.
209 Moghul & Ahmed, supra note 143, at 189-90.
210 IBRAHIM WARDE, IsLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2000).
2 See generally Hamoudi, supra note 19, at 116-22 (discussing commercial practices and
the use of informal rules based on shari'a by Shi'i merchants in Iraq).
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shari'a is simply unequipped to deal with current political and economic
conditions. Nor can they support some form of complete separation ofshari 'a
from law given their own ideological preferences in the structure of the family,
for example. The inconsistency, born of hard experience, is fundamentally a
necessity. Nevertheless, the search for logic and consistency dies hard, and
many scholars resist the broader notion that even Islamists implicitly and
willingly accept that the state and not Islam proclaims and enforces all law.
Assumptions respecting the ubiquity of shari'a appear with some frequency in
our scholarship as a result, presumably on the basis of the demonstrably rising
interest in Islam throughout the Muslim world over the past several decades.
After all, anyone can see that the number of veils on a street in Cairo or
Baghdad is much higher than it was, say, four decades ago, and surely, one
might be led to assume, this must mean that shari'a is poised to return as the
supreme law of the land. Seemingly on the basis of such assumptions, shari 'a,
as an all encompassing, comprehensive legal system, begins to creep into
scholarly ruminations of the law, as if once the veil is adopted, then the
commitment to Islam, and to shari'a, as supreme and sole law is absolute.
Religion then begins to take on an outsized role relative to its importance in
particular areas of law. The trial of Osama Bin Laden under rules of shari 'a
has been a recurring curiosity of mine, whether raised as a theoretical exercise
in an essay in a prestigious law journal21 2 or as a policy to be considered by the
United States at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Comparative
Law, 213 at least partially on the assumption, it seems, that such a trial would be
viewed as more legitimate to the world's Muslims. In an area far closer to my
area of expertise, suggestions have appeared in scholarship to suggest that Iraq
should be urged to adopt something akin to Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code as promulgated in the U.S., concerning the taking of
security on a debt, through a justificatory exercise relying on shari'a, and
Islamic finance in particular.214
There is something coherent and logical in suggesting that once one accepts
part of the shari 'a as God's law, then there is no choice but to accept all of it,
in all areas encompassed by it, as absolutely sovereign. Yet the actualities of
law in the Muslim state hardly seem to give credence to the constructed
mythology of an exotic shari 'a acting as invisible puppet master, pulling the
212 Frank E. Vogel, The Trial of Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 53 (2002).
213 Faiz Ahmed, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Comparative
Law, The West and the Rest (Oct. 2, 2008) (on file with author).
214 Mark J. Sundahl, Iraq, Secured Transactions, and the Promise ofIslamic Law, 40 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1301, 1306 (2007).
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requisite strings as law is developed in the state, ensuring broad conformity
with the will of God. The overwhelming majority of Muslim lawyers in the
world, of widely varying levels of religiosity, would be as perplexed as any
American lawyer in applying Islamic criminal law to a trial of Bin Laden,
because they have operated under entirely different, and largely transplanted,
legal systems for nearly a century.2"5 The idea that most of them would not
accept a trial of Bin Laden under the same transplanted principles of criminal
justice to which they are themselves subject seems difficult to understand or
accept.
The popular mantra of more reductive accounts is that this can generally be
explained by a lack of democracy; that, in other words, Muslims are
overwhelmingly committed to the shari'a and view it as the touchstone of all
legal legitimacy, but that institutions of power prevent their exercising this
preference in a manner that will lead to substantive change.216 This is far too
simplistic an explanation, and is in any event generally outdated. Any number
of democracies now exist in the Muslim world, including in nations like
Indonesia217 and Iraq21 which have endured their share of terrorist violence,219
and yet in these two countries in particular, there are no calls to deal with this
violence through the reinstitution of shari'a criminal law. In Iraq, Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani has repeatedly asked the state to ensure the security of
the Shi'i Holy Sites,22 and surely he is aware that they will not be using
shari'a methods to enforce the criminal laws when they provide this
protection. In Indonesia, calls for shari'a in the criminal law are generally
localized in regions such as Aceh.221
With respect to the question of shari 'a financing in Iraq, the situation is
even starker. Professor Sundahl has provided careful and comprehensive
information on the relationship of Islamic finance to questions of obtaining
215 Abu-Odeh, supra note 3, at 791-92.
216 FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 142-45.
217 Hamoudi, supra note 4.
218 I was a witness and, indeed, a participant in Iraq's first democratic election, held in
January of 2005.
219 See, e.g., Dan Murphy, Indonesian Cleric Fights for a Muslim State, CHRISTIAN ScI.
MONITOR, May 2,2002, at 7, available athttp://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0502/p07s0l -woap.
html (discussing the alleged terrorist network lead by Abu Bakar Bashir); Edward Wong &
Robert F. Worth, Shi'ite Fury Explodes in Iraq; Scores are Killed Sunnis Breck Off Talks to
Farm Unified Government, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 24, 2006, at IR, available at 2006
WL 3225498 (describing reverse attacks in Baghdad after the bombing of a Shi'ite shrine).
220 Wong & Worth, supra note 219.
221 Ichwan, supra note 177, at 210-11.
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security over a loan,222 and for this he deserves commendation. It is only when
Iraq is included that one is left perplexed. Merchants in Iraq have lived for
decades without Islamic finance and even Islamist parties appear relatively
unconcerned with the practice.223 In the area of finance in Iraq, shari'a is
simply not part of the conversation. What then is the justification for
discussing all of this in the context of Iraq? Professor Sundahl provides only
one-the enactment of the Iraq Constitution, complete with its repugnancy
clause.224 Once a nation expresses its commitment to shari'a, the logic seems
to run, it must be complete and entire.
It is not unusual to hear scholars lament the broad Western hostility to
entertain or consider shari 'a as a potential source of law, whether that be
reluctance to engage in shari 'a financing25 or unwillingness to allow Islamist
control of states.226 Certainly it is true that the broad and largely unreflective
demonization of shari "a is not helpful to understanding the region, but I am
concerned with a different phenomenon, one grounded not in American
unwillingness to countenance shari 'a, but rather in what my colleague Lama
Abu-Odeh refers to as "The Politics of (Mis)recognition '227 the notion that
the Muslim world must somehow be understood solely through the lens of
shari 'a and that legitimacy in law cannot be achieved without it. I defer to no
one in my distaste for American efforts in failing to grapple with the realities
of shari 'a in the Muslim state and instead seek to minimize its impact in the
hopes that one day it might disappear. Still, there are different manners of
hegemony in the world, and they can run in opposing directions. Personally,
as one intimately connected to law in one Middle Eastern country, Iraq, I can
think of nothing more insulting to the millions of Muslim lawyers, judges and
law professors, some secular, some devout, many devoted to the rule of law,
than to dismiss the work to which they have dedicated their lives as somehow
illegitimate, inauthentic or fantastical in the eyes of their fellow citizens.
There is simply no evidence to sustain such a proposition.
222 Sundahl, supra note 214.
223 Hamoudi, supra note 163, at 534 n.56
224 Sundahl, supra note 214, at 1303-04.
225 Id. at 1306.
226 FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 145.
227 Abu-Odeh, supra note 3.
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